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INTRODUCTION

"On an average day, 15 people die waiting for an organ that could have
saved their lives-that's someone every 96 minutes."' Each year, thousands of
preventable deaths occur due to an inadequate supply of organs for
transplantation. 2 This well-documented organ shortage 3 has led, in some parts
of the world, to a thriving black market in organs. 4 A wide range of suggestions

for addressing this problem has been proposed, from presumed consent laws5 to
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2003.
1. Press Release, Health Res. and Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS
Will Expand Funds to Study Ways to Increase Organ and Tissue Donations (Apr. 17, 2001) (quoting
Secretary of Health
and Human
Services Tommy G. Thompson),
available at
http://newsroom.hrsa.gov/releases/2001%20Releases/organgrant.htm.
2. 6,439 of the patients who had been on the waiting list in 2001 died without receiving an organ.
Procurement and Transplantation Network, About Donation-The Critical Shortage, at
http://www.optn.org/about/donation/criticalShortage.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2002); see also Robert
S.D. Higgins & Roger Evans, Introduction: The Organ Donor Dilemma: Assessing the Needfor Organ
Donors and Methods to Increase the Supply, in THE MULTI-ORGAN DONOR: SELECTION AND
MANAGEMENT 3, 8 (Robert S.D. Higgens et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter THE MULTI-ORGAN DONOR]
("8% of liver recipients and approximately 5% of kidney recipients may die before an appropriate donor
organ becomes available."); Alexander Powhida, Comment, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed
Consent to Organ Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 349, 353 (1999) ("Presently, potential organ recipients die while on organ transplant
waiting lists.").
3. See Daniel Yee, Donation of Organs Low for Kids as Waiting List Grows, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 2001, at B3; Abe Aamidor, Transplant Candidates Face Shortage of Available
Organs, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 6, 2002, at 7B; Timothy A. McDermott, Professor's Untimely Death
Highlights CriticalNeedfor Organ Donations,VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 28, 2002, at B8; Leonard Greene,
Shortage of Organs Leaves Few Options, N.Y. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at 5.
4. See, e.g., Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Organ of Last Resort, UNESCO COURIER, July/Aug.
2001, at 50; Michael Finkel, This Little Kidney Went to Market, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 27, 2001,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/27/magazine/27ORGAN.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2002);
Jennifer O'Brien, The Body Part 'Black Market ';-Sale of OrgansShows Human Desperation,TORONTO
SUN, May 27, 2001, at 18. For somewhat dated academic commentary on illegal organ trafficking, see
Maria N. Morelli, Note and Comment, Organ Trafficking: Legislative Proposalsto Protect Minors, 10
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 917 (1995); Christian Williams, Note, Combatting [sic] the Problems of
Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through PresumedDonor Consent, 26 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 315, 318-22 (1994).
5. See Williams, supra note 4, at 364 ("Presumed consent is the most efficient and least violative of
the procurement methods currently in existence, and should be adopted by nations worldwide in
conjunction with a ban on all organ sales."). Some commentators have argued that presumed consent
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a national organ draft. 6 Some commentators have argued that parent-guardians
should be permitted to tender proxy consent for organ donation on behalf of
legally incompetent individuals (children and the mentally impaired) when the7
intended recipient is an immediate family member of the potential donor,
while others
have gone so far as to recommend the use of anencephalic infants
8
as donors.
One idea that has received a great deal of attention is the establishment of a
market in organs. 9 It has been argued that a person should be able to sell the
rights to her organs, to take effect upon her death, in a "futures market."' 10
laws are unconstitutional, see Powhida, supra note 2, at 374 ("[T]he presumed consent laws of the
various states should be deemed unconstitutional, requiring the states to provide process before the
wishes of family members are disregarded."), while others maintain they are morally illegitimate, see
R.M. Veatch & J.B. Pitt, The Myth of PresumedConsent: EthicalProblems in New Organ Procurement
Strategies, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1888 (1995), in part because they disproportionately impact the
poor and minorities, who are least likely to be aware of their legal rights and to effectuate their will by
opting out of the system.
6. See Theodore Silver, The Casefor a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ
DraftAct, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681 (1988) (arguing in favor of an "organ draft," with an exception for people
who object on religious grounds); cf Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes: Assessing the
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 528, 574 (1990) ("The values that underlie both the due process and the takings clauses contain
as much meaning when the government appropriates the body of one's next of kin as when it takes one's
television set.").
7. Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consentfor Organ Donation by Incompetents, Ill YALE L.J.
1215, 1217 (2002) ("[T]he constitutional rights of children and mentally impaired persons (collectively,
incompetents) are violated when the law fails to provide a mechanism through which proxy consent may
be tendered for donation of a nonvital organ to an immediate family member."); cf Cara Cheyette, Note,
Organ Harvestsfrom the Legally Incompetent: An Argument Against Compelled Altruism, 41 B.C. L.
REV. 465, 469 (2000) ("[O]rgan harvests from children and mentally disabled adults should be
categorically prohibited.... [U]sing the most vulnerable members of society to shield us from the pain
of a loved one's illness or imminent death is unfair.").
8. Jay A. Friedman, Taking the Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for Pediatric
Organ Transplants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 977-78 (1990) (arguing that the decision to donate the
organs of an anencephalic infant should "rest in the hands of those whose love for the infant will guide
them in selecting a plan that will give meaning to the child's brief existence"). Other scholars have
argued that to consider anencephalic infants legally dead and harvest their organs for transplantation is
immoral. See Gloria Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participantsin a Commercialized Organ TransplantationSystem, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 63 (1995)
("Courts should continue to preserve the lives of dying incompetents even where some third party may
benefit from the patient's death."); Alan Shewmon et al., The Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ
Donors, 261 JAMA 1773, 1780 (1989) (arguing that "the moral confusion unwittingly introduced into
society" by harvesting organs from anencephalic infants "would constitute a far greater evil than the
good done to the relatively few surviving recipients of these organs").
9. The American Medical Association recently took a tentative step in this direction. In June, 2002,
it enacted a resolution stating, "Physicians should encourage and support pilot studies.., that
investigate the effects of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation for the purpose of examining
and possibly revising current policies in the light of scientific evidence." Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouragingthe Study of Motivation, available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja report la02.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
It stressed, however, that "payment for an organ from a living donor should not be a part of any study."
Id. Furthermore, the pilot programs must not involve "the purchase of donated organs [by their intended
recipients]; the distribution of organs for transplantation should continue to be governed by UNOS,
based on ethically appropriate criteria related to medical need." Id.
10. Banks, supra note 8, at 77-79 (discussing posthumous organ markets); Gregory S. Crespi,
Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creationof a Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
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Some academics have also suggested "spot" markets, where families of
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proposals are invariably
met with a wide range of ethical objections, discussed
12
later in this Note.
This Note suggests a new approach to organ donation, one that has received
scant attention in medical journals, 13 and has been mentioned in passing in only
a handful of law review articles 14-paired organ exchanges. Articles suggesting
the creation of markets in organs ignore the possibility of such a system.1 5 It is
not mentioned in Arthur Caplan and Daniel Coelho's comprehensive
compilation of works on the social, ethical, and legal aspects of organ
transplantation policy,1 6 nor is it discussed in most examinations of "rewards"
7
for organ donation.'
This Note argues that federal law should be amended so as to allow the
already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring
together the families and friends of different patients on the waiting list in order
to save lives. There are many people who, although willing to donate a nonvital
1, 28 (1994); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Banks, supranote 8, at 76-77.
12. See infra Part V.
13. A thorough examination of major medical journals reveals that paired organ exchange has been
the topic of one four-page article written in 1986, F.T. Rapaport, The Case for a Living Emotionally
Related InternationalKidney Donor Exchange Registry, 18 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 5 (1986), one
four-page editorial published in 1997, Lainie Friedman Ross et al., Ethics of a Paired-KidneyExchange
Program, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1752 (1997), and one short letter to the editor in response to the
editorial, addressing the possibility of establishing such a program in England, Robert A. Sells, Paired
Kidney-Exchange Programs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1392 (1997). Rapaport's article is also cited in
passing in A.S. Daar et al., Ethics and Commerce in Live Donor Renal Transplantation:Classification
of the Issues, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 922, 923 n.15 (1990). None of these sources delve deeply
into the legal framework necessary for such a program, nor do they appear to have received widespread
attention.
14. No prior law review articles propose a paired organ exchange program. Those few pieces which
do mention the possibility of something similar dedicate no more than two or three sentences to the idea
and do not develop it in any detail or suggest any concrete steps for implementation. See, e.g., Phyllis
Coleman, "'BrotherCan You Spare a Liver?" Five Ways to Increase Organ Donation, 31 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1996) ("Organ trading represents another alternative for live, intrafamily donors. Under this
plan, a donor whose organ is not suitable for a family member could trade his kidney for one which was
compatible."); Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1036-37 (1985) ("[l]f
a donor's organ is incompatible with the recipient, the donor could trade his organ for a suitable
match.").
15. Seesupra notes 10-11.
16.

THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H.

Coelho eds., 1998).
17. See, e.g., RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN

AMERICAN SOCIETY 64-72 (1992); Banks, supra note 8, at 78; Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Procurement:
It's Not in the Cards, in LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 494,495-96
(Joseph H. Howell & William Frederick Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000); Christopher Cates, Trend and
Development, Property in Human Tissues: History, Society, and Possible Implementations, 4 APPEAL
32, 39-43 (1998); Julie Mull Strange & David C. Taylor, Organ and Tissue Donation, in
TRANSPLANTATION NURSING: ACUTE AND LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT 77, 81 (Marie T. Nolan &

Sharon M. Augustine eds., 1995) [hereinafter TRANSPLANTATION NURSING]; Williams, supra note 4, at
344-51.
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organ to save the life of a loved one in need of a transplant, are unable to do so
due to biological incompatibility. 18 A system of paired organ exchanges would
facilitate transplantation in situations where a friend or family member of
Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other
person on the waiting list (Patient B), and a close friend or family member of
Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A. The family
member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on
the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible
nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange." While
potential enforcement issues can be avoided by conducting the transplants at
the same time and, if possible, in the same hospital, this is not essential to my
proposal.
I contend that paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under
federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of
patients in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially
willing to donate on behalf of each patient, and using this data to identify crossmatches. By permitting and facilitating paired organ exchanges, the
government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would
otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to
occur that might otherwise be impossible. This system would, of course, be
limited to the exchange of nonvital or regenerable organs (kidneys and livers),
where donation would not endanger the donor or adversely impact the donor's
major life activities.
This Note is divided into six parts. Part I explores the science behind organ
donation, focusing on one of the major impediments to successful
transplantation-compatibility. An "incompatible" organ would be "rejected"
by its recipient's body, further exacerbating her underlying condition and
endangering her life. This discussion of compatibility establishes the criteria a
paired organ exchange system should use to identify cross-matches. This Part
also demonstrates the safety of organ donation, reviewing the extremely low
mortality and morbidity rates for donors.
Part II explores the current legal and regulatory framework of organ
donation in the United States. It explains the laws and administrative
regulations governing local organ procurement organizations (OPOs), as well
as the nationwide network coordinating their activities. In particular, this Part
examines the way in which organs currently are allocated among patients on
the waiting list. Part III discusses the logistics of a paired organ exchange
system. It sets forth the statutory and regulatory changes required for its
implementation, and describes the practical details of how an exchange would
be executed. Finally, this part analyzes the relationship between paired organ
18. See infra Section I.B.
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exchanges and existing legal prohibitions against the sale of organs.
Part IV addresses two threshold philosophical issues that must be settled
before a meaningful discussion about the moral legitimacy of paired organ
exchanges can occur. First, it argues that it is possible for a family member to
give legitimate voluntary consent to organ donation when the life of a loved
one hangs in the balance. This Part further emphasizes that organ donors have
the moral right to direct their gifts toward particular recipients. While these
propositions may seem basic, and perhaps even obvious, they have been
challenged repeatedly in recent years by academic commentators. These core
principles underlie both paired organ exchanges as well as traditional voluntary
organ donation. Part V demonstrates how paired organ exchanges are immune
from the ethical criticisms that are often leveled against outright markets in
organs. Part VI concludes.
Paired organ exchanges have largely been ignored by both the legal and
medical literature. By proposing a specific statutory and regulatory framework
to both permit and facilitate such exchanges, and responding to potential
objections to this system, this Note seeks to take the first steps toward
preventing unnecessary suffering and untimely death.
I.

THE SCIENCE OF TRANSPLANTATION

This Part examines scientific issues pertaining to organ donation that affect
the efficacy and morality of paired organ exchanges. For an organ transplant to
be successful, the donated organ must be both suitable for transplantation and
"compatible" with its intended recipient. Section A considers the medical
procedures physicians use to determine whether an organ is suitable for
transplantation. If the prospective donor suffers from certain medical
conditions, transplanting one of her organs may pose enhanced risk to both the
donor and the recipient. Section B explores the specific factors that determine
an organ's compatibility with a particular patient. A perfectly healthy yet
incompatible organ would be "rejected" by its recipient's body, triggering
severe adverse medical consequences. 19 This Section seeks to identify factors
19. If the recipient is ABO-incompatible with a donor, or is MHC-incompatible and has previously
been exposed to the donor's MHC antigens, she will immediately experience hyperacute rejection. THE
MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL HOSPITAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT TEAM & H.F. PIZER, ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS: A PATIENT'S GUIDE 21 (1991) [hereinafter PIZER, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS]. If a recipient
is MHC-incompatible with a donor but has not been previously exposed to the donor's incompatible
antigens, it will take her body several days to recognize and develop antibodies to attack them; when this
happens, she will suffer acute rejection, also called acute cellular rejection. See id. at 22 ("[B]etween
five and ten days after transplantation, the recipient's T cells begin to respond to the donor organ's
histocompatibility antigens. The injury caused by this cellular immune response is called acute
rejection.") (emphasis in original); see also Julie S. Tart, Recovery Following Liver Transplantation,in
MEDICAL CARE OF THE LIVER TRANSPLANT PATIENT 137, 149 (Paul G. Killenberg & Pierre-Alain

Clavien eds., 1997) ("Acute cellular rejection .... leads to direct and indirect activation of recipient Tlymphocytes that then proliferate and travel to the transplanted organ. The infiltrating lymphocytes
cause tissue damage by a number of mechanisms.").
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that a paired organ exchange system should use to match donors and recipients
with each other to avoid such outcomes. Section C argues that these
compatibility requirements are necessary, notwithstanding the existence of
immunosuppressive drugs. Finally, Section D focuses on the safety of organ
donation, arguing that kidney and liver donation do not pose undue risks to
living donors.
A. GeneralRequirementsfor Organ Donation
Physicians carefully examine individuals seeking to become living kidney
or liver donors to see if they have any medical conditions that would pose a
threat to the prospective recipient or make donation unusually dangerous to the
donor. Routine testing includes "an electrocardiogram, chest X-ray, liver
enzymes, serum cholesterol, and fasting glucose." 20 Physicians screen for
transmissible infectious diseases such as hepatitis B and C, HIV/AIDS,
cytomegalovirus, and the Epstein-Barr virus. They also consider the anatomy
of the potential donor's kidney or liver to see if there are any physical
contraindications to donation. 22 While physicians analyze urine samples and
perform other tests to ensure that a kidney to be transplanted is functioning
properly, 23 no reliable tests currently exist to detect "donor-related
nonfunction" in livers.24
B. Determining Whether Organs are Compatible with ParticularPatients
The considerations that determine whether a donated organ will be
compatible with its intended recipient depend on the organ involved.
Subsection 1 examines the factors relevant to kidney compatibility, while
Subsection 2 discusses those related to liver compatibility.

20. Amy L. Friedman etal., The Living Kidney Donor, in THE MULTI-ORGAN DONOR, supra note
2, at 173, 180 [hereinafter Friedman, The Living Kidney Donor] (discussing testing of potential living
kidney donors); Amy L. Friedman et al., The Living Liver Donor, in THE MULTI-ORGAN DONOR, supra
note 2, at 265, 275-76 [hereinafter Friedman, The Living Liver Donor] (discussing testing of potential
living liver donors).
21. Friedman, The Living Kidney Donor,supra note 20, at 180; Friedman, The Living Liver Donor,
supra note 20, at 276; Peggy Schreck Pattella & Patricia D. Weiskittel, Kidney Transplantation, in
ORGAN

AND

TISSUE

TRANSPLANTATION,

NURSING

CARE

FROM

PROCUREMENT

THROUGH

REHABILITATION 43, 54 (M.K. Gaedeke Norris & Mary Anne House eds., 1991) [hereinafter ORGAN
AND TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION] ("All [kidney] donors and recipients are further screened for the
presence of certain viruses. Routine screening for hepatitis, HIV, cytomegalovirus (CMV), and EpsteinBarr virus (EBV) is common pre-transplant.").
22. Friedman, The Living Kidney Donor, supra note 20, at 176-77; Friedman, The Living Liver
Donor,supra note 20, at 268-72.
23. Friedman, The Living Kidney Donor,supra note 20, at 178.
24. Friedman, The Living Liver Donor, supranote 20, at 276.
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1. Kidney Compatibility
Assuming that a kidney meets the suitability requirements for
transplantation discussed in Section I.A, it must still be histocompatible with its
recipient for the transplant to be a success. Histocompatibility refers to the
ability of an organ to be transplanted into a recipient's body without triggering
an adverse reaction (rejection) from the recipient's immune system.25
"Antigens" are proteins found on the outer membranes of most cells in the
human body.26 White blood cells (also called lymphocytes), the backbone of
the human immune system, are able to recognize antigens on cell membranes.
This ability enables white blood cells to protect the body by identifying and
destroying foreign cells-that is, cells with foreign antigen signatures. 27 "If
cells enter the system that have significantly different antigens on their
surfaces, the existing or host system will mount an immune response, creating
antibodies to coat or destroy the foreign antigens as well as their carrier
cells., 28 This response is what gives rise to rejection.
For a kidney to be histocompatible with a potential recipient, only two sets
of antigens must match-ABO and MHC (also called the HLA system). 29 If a
donor is both ABO-compatible and MHC-compatible with the recipient, the
donor is said to be "histocompatible" with the recipient. The ABO antigen
system refers to blood types; there are only two types of antigens in the ABO
system-A antigens and B antigens. 30 This gives rise to the following blood
type possibilities: blood type A (the patient has only A antigens), blood type B
(the patient has only B antigens), blood type AB (the patient has both A and B
antigens), and blood type 0 (the patient has no antigens).3 '
As noted earlier, white blood cells trigger immune responses when they
identify foreign antigens in the body. Thus, anyone can receive type-O blood
because it does not contain any antigens that would trigger an immune

25. See Kathleen S. Rohrer, TransplantationImmunology, in TRANSPLANTATION NURSING, supra
note 17, at 1, 6 ("The more alike the donor and recipient tissues are, the less rejection is likely to occur.
Histocompatibility testing is the evaluation of donor antigens with recipient antibodies.").
26. THE DICTIONARY OF IMMUNOLOGY 15 (W. John Herbert et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985) (defining an
antigen as "a molecule that elicits a specific immune response when introduced into the tissues of an
animal ....If antigens are to stimulate a response they must normally be foreign to the animal to which
they are administered ....
").
27. See PIZER, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 19, at 14 ("In human transplantation, the immune
response to the replacement organ occurs because our lymphocytes recognize-as they should-that the
new organ is not really part of ourselves.").
28. Pamela Weinberg, The Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) System, the Search for a Matching
Donor,National Marrow Donor ProgramDevelopment, and Marrow Donor Issues, in BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE, AND NURSING INSIGHTS 105, 106 (Marie Bakitas Whedon

ed., 1991).
29. See Rohrer, supra note 25, at 6-9; see also PIZER, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 19, at 2123; Pattella & Weiskittel, supra note 21, at 54-55; Weinberg, supranote 28, at 106.
30. P1ZER, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 19, at 23-24.
31. Rohrer, supra note 25, at 7.
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response. In contrast, a type-O patient can only receive type-O blood, because
the other blood types contain antigens that would cause an immune
reaction.
32
These limitations give rise to the following system of compatibility:
Patient's
Blood Type
A
B
AB
0

Antigens on
Cell Membranes
A
B
A and B
None

Compatible
Blood Types
A,O
B,O
A, B, AB, O
0

"ABO grouping is the primary determinant for solid organ transplantation.
The same compatibility rules that apply to blood transfusion apply to
transplantation." 33 Thus, to ensure histocompatibility, a donor's blood type

must match that of the potential recipient.34
The second type of histocompatibility is MHC-compatibility. 35 There are
six types of MHC antigens that are of particular relevance to organ

transplantation-A, B, C, DR, DQ, and DP (these names have no relationship
to the A and B antigens in the ABO-histocompatibility system). Each antigen
type is named after the site ("locus") in the chromosome where the gene that
codes for it is located.

Of these six important types of MHC antigens, physicians focus on three-

36
A, B, and DR-in determining whether donors and patients are compatible.
Humans have two copies of most genes, one from each of our parents; for each
of these three types of antigens, every person has two copies of the gene that
manufactures it.37 Consequently, there are six separate loci in the genome that

32. Id.at 6-7.
33. Id.at 6.
34. See L. Rydberg, ABO-Incompatibility in Solid Organ Transplantation,11 TRANSFUSION MED.
325, 325 (2001) ("The most important transplantation antigen system in solid organ transplantation is the
ABO histo-blood group system. Crossing the ABO barrier in solid organ transplantation is usually not
done except for emergency liver transplantations.").
35. MHC stands for "major histocompatibility complex." See Robert L. Yowell & Barbara A.
Araneo, Mechanisms ofAllograft Rejection, in SOLID ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION PATHOLOGY 4, 4
(Elizabeth H. Hammond ed., 1994). MHC-compatibility was previously referred to as HLA, or "human
leukocyte antigen," compatibility. Kathleen M. Siebold et al., Organ Procurement, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: A MANUAL FOR NURSES 3, 38 (Barbara A. Helene Williams et al. eds., 1991) ("The
MHC was formerly known as the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) system. The MHC defines self for the
immune system by directing placement of certain unique protein markers on selected cell surfaces,
called histocompatibility antigens, which can be detected in the laboratory.").
36. Rohrer, supra note 25, at 7-8 ("[T]he antigens at sites A, B, and DR have been demonstrated to
be the most important in predicting successful kidney transplantation. A perfect donor-recipient
relationship would produce a six-antigen match based on these three sites.").
37. The genes for MHC antigens are codominant, meaning that both genes are expressed-the
"products of both parental genes are found on the same cells." Abdul Ghaffar, MtfIC: Genetics and Role
in TransplantationImmunology, at http://www.med.sc.edu:85/ghaffar/mhc2000.htm (last visited Nov.
10, 2002).
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physicians test3 for MHC-compatibility; they are able to do so indirectly through
serum testing.38

Ideally, all six of a donor's A, B, and DR antigens would match those of a
potential recipient (a "six-point match"); nonetheless, transplants can be
successful with smaller numbers of MHC antigen matches. "The more antigens
that match, the less severe is the problem of rejection. The potential for a sixantigen match with an unrelated donor is very rare." 39 The importance of
MHC-compatibility for kidney transplants was recognized by the President's

Task Force
on Organ Donation 4 and by the United Network for Organ Sharing
4 1
(UNOS).

38. As previous commentators have explained:
The basic tissue typing technique involves placing the tissue cells to be typed into numerous
'wells,' each with a different type of serum known to contain antibodies to a specific
antigen ....If the antibodies of a particular serum result in the death of the tissue cells that
are to be typed, one can infer that the cells must have that particular antigen expressed on their
surface.
Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation,46 VAND. L. REv. 805, 815 n.47
(1993).
39. Rohrer, supra note 25, at 8.
40. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (1986) [hereinafter TRANSPLANTATION TASK FORCE REPORT] ("Organ sharing
should be mandated for perfectly matched (HLA A, B, and DR) donor-recipient pairs and for donors and
recipients with zero antigen mismatches (assuming that at least one antigen has been identified at each
locus for both donor and recipient).").
41. MHC-compatibility is one of the primary determinants of who receives organs under UNOS's
allocation system for donated cadaveric organs. Under the UNOS system, if a patient is fully MHCcompatible (all six of the patient's MHC loci match those of the donated organ), the patient is entitled to
the organ. United Network for Organ Sharing, Organ Distribution:Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys,
§ 3.5.3.3 ("[I]f there is any patient on the UNOS Patient Waiting List for whom there is a zero-antigen
mismatch with a standard donor, the kidney(s) from that donor shall be offered to the appropriate UNOS
member for the patient with the zero antigen mismatch .. ").If no six-point matches can be found
within a designated time period, id. § 3.5.3.5, the OPO that recovered the organ begins looking for a
compatible recipient, first in the OPO's local service region, id. § 3.5.6.1 ("With the exception of
kidneys that are I) shared as a result of a zero antigen mismatch, [or] 2) offered as payback as defined in
Policy 3.5.5 ...all kidneys will be allocated first to local patients.., in the locale where the kidneys are
procured."), then in the larger UNOS region in which the OPO is located, see id. § 3.5.6.2 ("If a standard
donor kidney is not accepted by any of the local transplant centers for local patients, the kidney is to be
allocated next via the regional list consisting of all patients on the Waiting Lists of other UNOS
Members within the [OPO's] UNOS region .. "),and finally, if no recipient has been found, on the
nationwide waiting list. See id. § 3.5.6.3 ("If a standard donor kidney is not accepted by any transplant
center in the UNOS region in which the UNOS member which procured the kidney is located, the
kidney is to be allocated to UNOS Members for specific patients in the other UNOS regions nationally
according to the point system .. "). The only exception to this scheme of gradually expanding
geographic areas is where an OPO has previously received a kidney through UNOS from another OPO
under exceptional circumstances, such as a six-point match kidney, or a kidney granted to the OPO outof-order because it was necessary to facilitate a multi-organ transplant where the other organ had
become available. In such cases, the receiver-OPO "owes" the donor-OPO an organ. When the receiverOPO obtains a kidney of the same blood type as the one it received under exceptional circumstances, it
must offer it to the donor-OPO, notwithstanding the usual geographic considerations. See id. § 3.5.5.
If multiple patients at the regional or national levels are compatible with a particular kidney, it is
allocated according to a point system. See id. § 3.5.6.2 ("When a standard donor kidney is allocated
regionally, it is to be offered to UNOS Members for specific patients in the region according to the point
system .. "); id. § 3.5.6.3 (stating that kidney allocations on the national level must be made
"according to the point system"). OPOs are not required to use the point system when distributing
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Liver Compatibility

The criteria for liver compatibility are somewhat less stringent than for
kidney compatibility-unlike kidneys, donated livers need not be MHCcompatible.
The most important consideration in matching liver donor and recipient is bloodtype compatibility and body size. Therefore, accurate height and weight [and blood
type] of the potential donor must be determined. Previous studies have found that
the liver is not as immunologically active as other organs; unlike
4 2 the kidney, no
relationship has been found between tissue matching and rejection.

43
Existing UNOS criteria for allocation of livers take these factors into account.

organs within their local region. See id. § 3.5.6.1.
To designate a kidney recipient through the point system, UNOS begins by identifying the universe
of patients on the waiting list who are potentially eligible to receive the kidney. ABO-compatibility with
the donor organ is an absolute prerequisite for a waiting list patient to have a chance of receiving it. See
id. § 3.5.11 ("When information about a donor is entered into the UNOS Match System, all patients who
have an ABO blood type that is compatible with that of the donor and who are listed as active on the
UNOS Patient Waiting List will be assigned points and priority ....). Moreover, UNOS policy
requires that kidneys of certain ABO types be given only to patients of that blood type, despite the fact
that patients of other blood types would be biologically compatible with it. For instance, due to the
relative scarcity of type-B kidneys (roughly 10% of the population in the United States is type B),
"kidneys from a type B donor are to be allocated only to blood type B patients," id. § 3.5.2, despite the
fact that type-B organs could be successfully transplanted into type-AB patients. Similarly, although
type-O kidneys can be transplanted into recipients of any blood type (due to their lack of antigens),
because type-O patients can receive only type-O kidneys, "blood type 0 donor kidneys are to be
allocated only to blood type 0 patients ..."Id.
The number of points each eligible patient receives is based primarily on the degree to which the
patient is MHC-compatible with the organ. See id. § 3.5.11.2 ("Points will be assigned to a patient based
on the number of mismatches between the patient's antigens and the donor's antigens. An antigen
mismatch occurs when a donor antigen would be recognized by the recipient as being different from the
recipient's own antigens."). Extra points are awarded based on the length of time the patient has been on
the waiting list. See id. § 3.5.11.1.1 ("[O]ne point will be assigned to the patient waiting for the longest
period with fractions of points being assigned proportionately to all other patients, according to their
relative time of waiting."). Patients for whom it is especially difficult to find histocompatible organs
receive extra points, see id. § 3.5.11.3 ("A patient will be assigned 4 points if he or she has panel
reactive antibody (PRA) level of 80% or greater."), as do minors, see id. § 3.5.11.5 ("Kidney transplant
candidates who are less than 11 years old shall be assigned four additional points for kidney allocation.
Candidates who are 11 years old or older but less than 18 years old will be assigned three additional
points ....). While the seriousness of a patient's medical condition is not taken into account in
allocating kidneys on the regional or national level, local OPOs can take patients' medical statuses into
account in allocating kidneys on the local level. See id. § 3.5.11.4 ("No points will be assigned to
patients based upon medical urgency for regional or national allocation of kidneys."). People who have
previously donated organs also receive extra points. See id. § 3.5.11.6 ("A patient will be assigned 4
points if he or she has donated for transplantation within the United States his or her vital organ or a
segment of a vital organ .. ").Notwithstanding the above point system, patients under 18 who have
been on the waiting list beyond certain time periods have priority for receiving organs. See id.
§ 3.5.11.5.1 ("Kidneys that are not shared mandatorily for 0 HLA mismatching, or for renal/non-renal
organ allocation, shall be offered first for transplant candidates who are less than 18 years of age at
listing and who have not received a kidney transplant within [certain specified time periods].").
42. Siebold, supra note 35, at 27; see also Laurel Williams, Liver Transplantation,in ORGAN AND
TISSuE TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 21, at 113, 123 ("The criteria for matching donors and recipients
for liver transplantation include compatible blood type and liver size.").
43. In allocating livers, UNOS takes into account the size of the donated liver, see United Network
for Organ Sharing, Organ Distribution: Allocation of Livers, § 3.6.1("For every potential liver
recipient, the acceptable donor size must be determined by the responsible surgeon. The UNOS Match
System will consider only potential liver recipients who are an acceptable size for that particular donor
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C. Immunosuppresive Drugs

Some critics have argued that, especially with the rise of immunosuppresive
therapies, antigen matching is not as essential as it used to be to ensuring
positive outcomes. 4 The most popular immunosuppressive drug is
cyclosporine.45 "Since its use in clinical practice, marked improvements in
outcome have been accomplished."' 46 As one commentator points out, however,
[t]he greatest advantage of cyclosporine is that it is a more focused agent than those
previously employed and does not weaken all aspects of the body's immunological
defenses. However, it does not act so specifically as to prevent rejection of the
transplanted organ without compromising the patient's resistance to other invasions,
such as infections. The use of this drug therefore requires treading a narrow and
shifting path between organ rejection and serious infectious illness.

Cyclosporine can also have severe side effects "such as hypertension,
hyperlipidemia, and nephropathy, and little has been gained with regard to the
''8
most important problem: the prevention of chronic allograft vasculopathy. A
Although it is an important part of modem transplant practice, cyclosporine
liver."), as well as its blood-type, see id. § 3.6.2. UNOS also considers the severity of patients' medical
conditions, see id.
§ 3.6.4 ("Each patient is assigned a status code or mortality risk score (probability of
pre-transplant death) which corresponds to how medically urgent it is that the patient receive a
transplant."), and the amount of time they have spent on the waiting list, see id.§ 3.6.3. While patients
in the locality of the OPO that recovered the liver are given some preference in the allocation algorithm,
they do not have absolute priority as they do under JNOS's kidney distribution policy. See id.§ 3.6
(describing the circumstances under which patients on the local or regional levels receive priority in the
liver allocation process).
44. See, e.g,, Benjamin Mintz, Analyzing the OPTN Under the State Action Doctrine-Can UNOS's
Organ Allocation CriteriaSurvive Strict Scrutiny?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 339, 392-93 (1995)
("Some medical studies have revealed that the putative benefits (with respect to survival rates) of
antigen matching are disappearing."). It has also been argued that antigen-matching requirements lead to
racial disparities in access to organs.
The antigen matching rules are a "but for" cause of this racial disparity. Because antigens are
distributed differently among racial groups, a white patient is more likely than a black patient
to have antigens that match those on a kidney from a white donor.... Because the proportion
of blacks on the waiting list is significantly higher than the proportion of kidneys donated by
blacks, white patients are more likely to have antigens that match those on donated kidneys.
Ayres, supra note 38, at 808-09.
45. See Venkataraman Ramanathan & J. Harold Helderman, Cyclosporine Formulations, in
CURRENT AND FUTURE IMMuNosuPPREsIvE THERAPIES FOLLOWING TRANSPLANTATION 111, 111
(Mohamed H. Sayegh & Giuseppe Remuzzi eds., 2001) [hereinafter IMMUNOSUPPRESIVE THERAPIES]
("Approved in 1983 by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for widespread clinical use, this drug has
improved the graft survival [sic] and has been the cornerstone in most immunosuppression protocols.").
46. Id.
47. JEFFREY PROTTAS, THE MOST USEFUL GIFT: ALTRUISM AND THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS 6 (1994).

48. P. Schnuelle & F.J. van der Woude, Clinical Trials in Transplant Immunosuppression: What
Have We Learned?, in IMMUNOSUPPRESSIVE THERAPIES, supra note 45, at 19, 20. Hyperlipidemia is "an
excess of lipids [fat]... in the plasma [blood]," MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH

DICTIONARY 791 (Kenneth Anderson et al. eds., 5th ed. 1998), that can lead to heart problems.
Nephropathy is "any disorder of the kidney, including inflammatory, degenerative, and sclerotic
conditions." Id. at 1095. Chronic allograft vasculopathy is a long-term, progressive disease of the blood
vessels stemming from a transplanted organ. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 50, 339, 1909
(Thomas Lathrop Stedman ed., 26th ed. 1995) (defining "allograft," "chronic," and "vasculopathy,"
respectively).
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should not be viewed as a substitute for organ compatibility. Given that
histocompatibility contributes to high transplantation success rates without
causing adverse side effects,4 9 the factors discussed in the preceding section
should be taken into account in a system of paired organ exchanges.
D. The Safety of Organ Donation

Living organ donation, the cornerstone of paired organ exchanges, is
widely accepted as safe for donors. 50 "Perioperative mortality for nephrectomy
[kidney removal] is very low, approximately 0.03%, with other major
complications occurring in less than 2% of cases ....Most centers with

surgeons who have considerable experience in partial hepatechtomy [removal
of part of the liver] report very low mortality and morbidity for such
operations."'5 1 According to another study, "the mortality for renal [kidney]
donors was reported as .06%, and the mortality associated with liver donation
was estimated as 1%to 2%.,, 52 Even more encouragingly, "[l]ong-term followups of the [kidney] donor's health do not give any increased evidence of
disease or 53disability. Less than 1% of the donors in this series regretted the
donation."
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

This part sets forth the existing regulatory

framework for organ

49. Among the studies Mintz cites that discuss the benefits of MHC-compatibility (which was then
known as HLA-compatibility) are Y.C. Zhou & J.M. Cecka, Effect of HLA Matching on Renal
TransplantSurvival, in CLINICAL TRANSPLANTS 499, 509 (Paul I. Terasaki & J.M. Cecka, eds., 1993)
("There was a stepwise decline in graft survival with increasing numbers of mismatched HLA
antigens.") and V.A. Lazda & M.E. Bleasing, Is Allocation of Kidneys on Basis of HLA Match Equitable
in Multiracial Populations, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1415, 1416 (1989) (noting that "HLA
matching appears to correlate favorably with transplant outcome"). See Mintz, supra note 44, at 394
n.271.
50. Pattella & Weiskittel, supra note 21, at 55 ("Studies indicate there is no significant risk to the
health of the living [kidney] donor."); J.D. Pirsch et al., Living-Unrelated Renal Transplantation:
Results in 40 Patients, 12 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASES 499, 502 (1988) ("Our results support the use of
living-unrelated donors to treat ESRD [End-Stage Renal Disease], especially for patients who do not
have available living-related donors or who do not want to wait for cadaver kidney transplants.").
51. Mark J. Cherry, Persons and Their Bodies: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Sale of Organs, in
PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE SALE OF ORGANS 1, 3 (Mark J.
Cherry ed., 1999).
52. Marie T. Nolan, Ethical Issues in Transplantation,in TRANSPLANTATION NURSING, supra note
17, at 361, 367 (citing R.W. Busuttil, Living-Related Liver Donation: CON, 23 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 43-45 (1991)). Of course, even when the risk of harm is low, tragedies can still occur. See Sylvia
Wood, Officials Examine 1999 Donor Death; North Carolina Case Involved Patient Who Gave Part of
His Liver, TIMES UNION, Apr. 5, 2002, at Al; Michael Lasalandra, Patient'sDeath Prompts Fears of
'Live Donor' Liver Transplants,BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 4, 2002, at 31.
53. Ingela Fehrman-Ekholm, Kidney Donors Don't Regret, 69 TRANSPLANTATION 2067, 2070
(2000); D. Weiland et al., Information on 628 Living-RelatedKidney Donors at a Single Institution, With
Long-Term Follow-Up in 472 Cases, 16 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 5,6 (1984) ("[T]he immediate and
long-term morbidity is sufficiently low to make the risk of kidney donation acceptable for fully
informed and motivated relatives of patients with ESRD.").
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transplantation in the United States. Section A explains the duties of organ
procuemlenest
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obtaining cadaveric organs for transplantation. Section B turns to the Organ
Procurement Transplantation Network (OPTN), the private entity under
contract with the federal government to oversee and coordinate the work of
organ procurement organizations. The OPTN is responsible for maintaining the
national registry of patients awaiting transplants; this Note suggests expanding
this database to facilitate the coordination of paired organ exchanges.54 Section

C examines the extent of federal government funding for kidney and liver
transplants. Finally, Section D explores the state and federal laws governing
organ donation.
A. Organ ProcurementOrganizations

When a doctor or nurse identifies a hospitalized patient who may make a
suitable

cadaveric

organ

donor,

she

contacts

the organ

procurement

organization (OPO) for her region; 55 each geographical area in the United
States is served by its own

OPO. 56

When the patient dies, the OPO is

responsible for obtaining consent from the patient's family (unless the decedent
had previously consented to organ donation) and removing the organ from the
donor.57 The OPO must also tissue-type the organ,5 8 determine its recipient
based on UNOS organ allocation criteria, 59 and "provide or arrange for the
transportation of donated organs" to the transplant center where the operation

will occur. 60 "OPOs have four basic functions that they are required to perform:
54. See infra Part III.
55. Each OPO is required to have "effective arrangements, to identify potential organ donors, with
a substantial majority of the hospitals and other health care entities in its service area which have
facilities for organ donations." 42 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2002).
56. Each OPO must confine its activities to a "defined service area that is of sufficient size to
assure maximum effectiveness in the procurement and equitable distribution of organs." Id.
§ 273(b)(1)(E).
57. Id. § 273(b)(3)(C) ("[The OPO must] arrange for the acquisition and preservation of donated
organs."). Often, "even if the deceased had shown a verbal or written intent to donate his or her organs,
the staff feels obligated to ask the family, who may then refuse to give permission." Luke Skelley,
PracticalIssues in Obtaining Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION:
SOCIETAL, MEDICAL-LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND REIMBURSEMENT ISSUES 261, 264 (Dale H. Cowan et

al. eds., 1987).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 2002).
59. See 42 C.F.R. 121.7(a)(1) (2001) ("An OPTN member procuring an organ shall operate the
OPTN computer match program within such time as the OPTN may proscribe to identify and rank
potential recipients for each cadaveric organ procured."). For a description of the criteria used to
determine which patient on the registry receives an available organ, see supra notes 41, 43. Federal law
further requires each OPO to "have a system to allocate donated organs equitably among transplant
patients according to established medical criteria," for organs that may be allocated by an OPO on the
local level. 42 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(3)(E) (West Supp. 2002); see also United Network for Organ Sharing,
Organ Distribution: Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys, § 3.5.6.1 (allowing OPOs to give preference to
their "local patients" in distributing kidneys, without directing them to use the UNOS point system).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(3)(F) (West Supp. 2002). Each OPO is also required to "have
arrangements to coordinate its activities with transplant centers in its service area." Id.§ 273(b)(3)(G).

Yale Law & Policy Review
recovery,

Vol. 21:221, 2003

preservation, and transportation of donated kidneys and the

maintenance of a system to locate prospective recipients for all recovered
organs."61

Federal law closely regulates many aspects of OPOs, including their fiscal
affairs 62 and the composition of their boards of directors. 63 Most saliently,

OPOs are required to participate in the federal Organ Procurement
Transplantation Network (OPTN). 64 The responsibility of OPOs is limited to
harvesting cadaveric organs; they do not play a role with regard to living
donors.
B. Organ Procurement TransplantationNetwork

The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is required to contract
with a "private nonprofit entity that has an expertise in organ procurement and
transplantation... for the establishment and operation of an Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network."4 5 The OPTN is required to

establish "a national list of individuals who need organs" and a "national
system.., to match organs and individuals" who need them.66 To determine
which patients get scarce organs as they come available, the OPTN is
responsible for establishing medical criteria by which to allocate them.67 It also
maintains a 24-hour hotline68so an OPO that retrieves an organ can ascertain the
patient to whom it must go.
In addition to maintaining the waiting list for organs, the OPTN acts as a
standard-setting organization. It must "adopt and use standards of quality for
the acquisition and transplantation of donated organs," including standards to
prevent the transmission of AIDS. 69 Since 1986, the Secretary has contracted
61. Siebold, supranote 35, at 10-11.
62. OPOs must conform to accounting standards set forth by the HHS Secretary, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 273(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2002), enter into agreements with the Secretary to be reimbursed under the
Social Security Act for procuring kidneys, id.§ 273(b)(1)(C), and have mechanisms for receiving
payments for non-renal organs delivered to transplant centers. Id. § 273(b)(l)(D).
63. Each OPO must ensure that its board of directors consists of representatives from each hospital
and transplant center in its territory, id.§§ 273(b)(1)(G)(i)(I), (V),members of the general public, id.
§ 273(b)(l)(G)(i)(II), and experts in histocompatibility and neurology. Id. §§ 273(b)(1)(G)(i)(III), (IV).
Alternatively, these groups can be represented on an "advisory board... [with] the authority to
recommend policies for the procurement of organs and the other functions" the OPO must perform. Id.
§ 273(b)(1 )(G)(ii).
64. Id. § 273(b)(3)(H); see infra Section II.B.
65. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 274(a), (b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2002). The OPTN must have a board of directors
including "representatives of organ procurement organizations... transplant centers, voluntary health
associations, and the general public." Id. § 274(b)(1)(B)(i).
66. Id. §§ 274(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii).
67. Id. § 274(b)(2)(B); see also id. § 274(b)(2)(D) ("[The OPTN must] assist organ procurement
organizations in the nationwide distribution of organs equitably among transplant patients."). The OPTN
must also "provide to members of the public an opportunity to comment with respect to ...[its] criteria"
for organ allocation. Id. § 274(b)(2)(B).
68. Id. § 274(b)(2)(C).
69. Id. § 274(b)(2)(E).
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with UNOS to administer the nation's OPTN. All OPOs and transplant centers
are required to be members of the OPTN, which is overseen by the Division of
Services Administration of the
Transplantation within the Health Resources
70
Department of Health and Human Services.

"[S]o extensive is its governmental character that people both inside and
outside the government argue that the OPTN is in effect a government agency
and ought to be structured like one." 7 1 There had once been complaints about
the fact that the government had vested authority over OPOs and transplant
centers in a private (albeit federally funded and regulated) organization. 72 Most
notably, hospitals and OPOs must comply with "the rules and requirements of[]
the [OPTN]" to be eligible for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. 73 To
avoid problems, the Secretary of HHS issued a rule stating, "The [OPTN]
Board of Directors shall ... [p]rovide to the Secretary, at least 60 days prior to

their proposed implementation, proposed policies it recommends to be
enforceable . . . (including allocation policies). These policies will not be
enforceable until approved by the Secretary." 74 Thus, "[u]nless the Secretary

has given approval to an OPTN policy, that policy remains voluntary and
unenforceable." 75 To date, none of UNOS's policies has been approved by the

Secretary, although voluntary compliance is the norm.
C. Government Fundingfor Kidney and Liver Transplants
In 1973, the federal government "began to fund kidney transplants as a
medical therapy appropriate to the treatment of end-stage renal disease

[ESRD].,, 76 Under this program, people who meet certain statutorily-specified
criteria 77 are "entitled to benefits under Part A" of Medicare, and are "eligible
70. See Div. of Transplantation, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., About the Division of
Transplantation(DoT), at http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/dot/about.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
71. PROTTAS, supra note 47, at 19.
72. Fred H. Cate, The Legal Regulation of Transplantation,in TRANSPLANTATION NURSING, supra
note 17, at 377, 382 ("[T]he question was raised whether Congress's provision for the required
membership of transplant centers and OPOs in the private OPTN (and the required compliance by these
entities with the Network's rules) vested in the OPTN federal regulatory power.").
73. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-8(a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(D) (1994); see also id. § 1320b-8(b)(1)(E) (1994)
(stating that a hospital must "allocate[] organs, within its service area and nationally, in accordance with
medical criteria and the policies of the [OPTN]" to be eligible for reimbursement of its "organ
procurement costs attributable to payments made to an [OPO]"); Ingrid Kinkopf-Zajac, Note, Assessing
Patient Compliance in the Selection of Organ Transplant Recipients, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 503, 510
(1996) ("To ensure compliance with UNOS policies, Congress made Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement to transplant centers contingent upon UNOS membership and adherence to the rules set
forth by UNOS.").
74. 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2) (2001).
75. Mintz, supranote 44, at 349.
76. Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks, The TransplantParadox: Overwhelming Public Support
for Organ Donation vs. Under-Supply of Organs: The Iowa Organ ProcurementStudy, 21 J. CORP. L.
767,771 (1996).
77. To be eligible, a person suffering from end-stage renal disease must be either "fully or currently
insured under the social security program (title II of the [Social Security] Act)" or "[e]ntitled to monthly
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to enroll under part B." 78 In addition to the hospitalization benefits provided

under Part A, federal law expressly authorizes reimbursement of
"transplantation services" for patients with ESRD. 79 The federal government
covers the expenses of kidney donors as well:
[A]ny individual who donates a kidney for transplant surgery shall be entitled to
benefits under parts A and B of this subchapter with respect to such donation.
Reimbursement for the reasonable expenses incurred by such an individual with
respect to a kidney donation shall be made (without regard to the deductible,
premium, and coinsurance provisions of this subchapter)... for all reasonable
preparatory, Oseration, and postoperation recovery expenses associated with such
donation ....

Coverage of liver transplants is less generous. The federal government pays
for some liver transplants for veterans and their families through the Veteran's
Administration and CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services).8 ' Some states choose to fund liver transplants under
Medicaid; there is a split among
United States Courts of Appeals about whether
82
they are required to do so.

This Note does not address the issue of whether the federal government
should play an expanded role in funding organ transplants for two reasons.
First, a paired organ exchange program will save lives without requiring the
government to incur new types of financial liabilities. I do not wish to cloud
debate on this issue by also advocating that the government take on an

social security or railroad retirement benefits," or be the spouse or child of such a person. See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 406.13(c)(1), (2) (2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 426-1(a)(1), (2) (1994).
78. Id. § 426-1 (a). According to the Health Care Financing Administration, "You can get Medicare
Part A no matter how old you are if your kidneys no longer work...." HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN.,
MEDICARE

COVERAGE

OF

KIDNEY

DIALYSIS

AND

KIDNEY

TRANSPLANT

SERVICES

9,

at

http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/esrdCoverage.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). In fact,
the official Medicare website describes Medicare, in part, as a "Health Insurance Program for ...People
with End-Stage Renal Disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a transplant)." U.S. Dep't
of
Health
&
Human
Servs.,
What
is
Medicare?,
available
at
http://www.medicare.gov/Basics/Whatls.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(1)(A) (1994).
80. Id. § 1395rr(d).
81. See Peter H. Schuck, Government Funding for Organ Transplants, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 169, 170, 173 (James F. Blumstein & Frank A.
Sloan eds., 1989) [hereinafter, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY].

82. See Lisa B. Deutsch, Medicaid Payment for Organ Transplants: The Extent of Mandated
Coverage, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 185 (1997) (arguing that coverage for organ transplants is
mandatory under the correct interpretation of the federal Medicaid Act). CompareEllis v. Patterson, 859
F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that "Congress intended the states to have discretion whether to
include organ transplants in their Medicaid plans") and Dexter v. Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979, 983 (9th Cir.
1993) ("[O]rgan transplants are excepted from Medicaid funding even when they are medically
necessary because they are not among the listed required services.") with Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d
723, 727 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Finding the plain language of the statute compelling.., we hold that the
Commonwealth is required by the terms of section 1396d to provide funds for medically necessary
transplants to children under the ages of twenty-one who are otherwise qualified under the State's
Medicaid plan.") and Pittman v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 998 F.2d 887, 891
(11 th Cir. 1993) ("We, like the Fourth Circuit, doubt that § 1396(b)(i)(1) gives the states discretion to
elect not to cover organ transplants."), cert. denied,510 U.S. 1030 (1993).
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enormous financial responsibility, thereby engendering unnecessary opposition
tomy basic proposal. Second, the issue of expanded access to health care is

extremely complex, and it seems arbitrary to advocate that the government pay
just for transplants stemming from paired organ exchanges, or even for
transplants in general. Given the wide range of unmet health needs throughout
our society, the proper scope of the federal government's role in ensuring
equitable access to health care deserves thoughtful consideration in its own

right. Thus, transplants occurring under the proposed paired organ exchange
system would be funded through either existing statutory mechanisms or
private sources such as health insurance.
D. State and FederalRegulation of OrganDonation

The primary federal restriction on organ donation is the National Organ
Transplantation Act's prohibition on selling organs, 83 discussed in detail later

in this Note.84 All fifty states have enacted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
886
(UAGA) of 1968." A revised version
of the UAGA was released in 1987,86 but
only twenty-three states and territories have adopted it. 87 Both versions of the
UAGA grant a person of legal age the right to donate her organs after her
death; 88 neither Act governs living organ donation. The Acts further provide
83. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994).
84. See infra Section III.C.
85. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 20 (1993) [hereinafter
1987 UAGA] ("The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was promulgated in 1968. It has been adopted in all
50 states and the District of Columbia.").
86. The biggest change under the 1987 Act is its "required request" provision. It requires hospitals
to ask each admitted patient whether he or she is an organ or tissue donor. "If the answer is negative or
there is no answer and the attending physician consents, the person designated shall discuss with the
patient the option to make or refuse to make an anatomical gift." Id. § 5(a), 8A U.L.A. 47. Similarly,
"[i]f, at or near the time of death of a patient, there is no medical record that the patient has made or
refused to make an anatomical gift, [a hospital representative] shall discuss the option to make or refuse
to make an anatomical gift and request the making of an anatomical gift .
I.."
Id. § 5(b), 8A U.L.A. 47.
Hospital personnel who fail to comply with these requirements are "subject to appropriate administrative
sanctions." Id. § 5(f), 8A U.L.A. 47.
The 1987 Act also sought to correct a problem that arose under its predecessor. Even though the
1968 UAGA authorized people to express their consent to donating their organs in written form, "few
transplant centers were willing to procure organs solely on the basis of a donor card or driver's license
consent by the deceased." Id. § 2 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 37. Consequently, in many cases where a hospital had
written evidence that a decedent had consented to organ donation, it would nonetheless seek the
permission of the decedent's family before removing his organs. "In situations in which family members
could not be located, less than twenty-five percent of respondents [in a survey of hospitals] said they
would proceed with organ procurement despite the presence of a written directive." Id. To overcome
hospitals' reluctance to rely on written consent, the 1987 UAGA emphasizes that "[a]n anatomical gift
that is not revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or
concurrence of any person after the donor's death." Id. § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34. The 1987 UAGA also
permits a coroner to remove a decedent's organs if the coroner cannot reach the decedent's immediate
family within a reasonable amount of time, "taking into account the useful life of the part," id. § 4(a)(2),
8A U.L.A. 43, and "does not know of a refusal or contrary indication by the decedent or objection by
[an immediate family member]."Id. § 4(a)(3), 8A U.L.A. 43.
87. See id. table ofjurisdictions wherein act has been adopted, 8A U.L.A. 3 (Supp. 2002).
88. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 99 (1993) [hereinafter 1968 UAGA]
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that a donor may either make an unrestricted gift (which under federal law
would be distributed according to UNOS criteria) 89 or "limit an anatomical9
gift" to a particular recipient, such as an individual in need of a transplant. 0
The 1987 UAGA contains an additional provision prohibiting the sale of organs
91
"if removal of the part[s] is intended to occur after the death of the decedent."
1II.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF A PAIRED ORGAN EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Having explored the science of organ transplantation and the legal structure

of the U.S. organ procurement system, I will now describe the details of my
proposed paired organ exchange policy. Section A explains how paired organ
exchanges would actually work. Section B sets forth suggested statutory and

regulatory provisions to implement this program. Finally, Section C examines
how paired organ exchanges relate to existing state and federal prohibitions on
the sale of organs.

("Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give all or any part of his body... the
gift to take effect upon death."); 1987 UAGA, supra note 85, §§ 1(1), 2(a)(i), 2(a)(iii), 8A U.L.A.29, 33
(recognizing the right of "[a]n individual who is at least [18] years of age [to] ...make an anatomical
gift... [or] refuse to make an anatomical gift," where the definition of "anatomical gift" is limited to
"donation of all or part of a human body to take effect upon or after death"). Immediate family members
of a decedent are also allowed to consent to donation of the decedent's organs "in the absence of actual
notice of contrary indications by the decedent." 1968 UAGA, supra, § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 99; accord 1987
UAGA, supra note 85, §§ 3(a), (b)(2), 8A U.L.A. 40-41.
A person may consent to organ donation in a will or by signing an organ donor card. 1968 UAGA,
supra note 88, §§ 4(a), (b), 8A U.L.A. 109; 1987 UAGA, supra note 85, §§ 1(3), 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 30,
33. The 1987 Act clarifies that driver's licenses may also contain an area to be used for this purpose. Id.
§§ 1(3), 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 30, 34. A person may revoke his decision to donate at any time. See 1968
UAGA, supra note 88, § 6, 8A U.L.A. 122; 1987 UAGA, supra note 85, §§ 2(0, (g), 8A U.L.A. 34.
The Acts prevent a physician "who tends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who
certifies the death... [from] participat[ing] in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part" from
a decedent. 1968 UAGA, supra note 88, § 7(b), 8A U.L.A. 124; accord 1987 UAGA, supra note 85,
§ 8(b), 8A U.L.A. 56. Once the donated organs are removed, "custody of the remainder of the body
vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin, or other persons under obligation to dispose of the body."
1968 UAGA, supra note 88, § 7(a), 8A U.L.A. 124; accord 1987 UAGA, supra note 85, § 8(a), 8A
U.L.A. 56. Both Acts specify that "A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act
or with the anatomical gift laws of another state [or a foreign country] is not liable for damages in any
civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act." 1968 UAGA, supra note
88, § 7(c), 8A U.LA. 124 (brackets in original); accord 1987 UAGA, supranote 85, § 1 (c), 8A U.L.A.
59-60.
89. 1968 UAGA, supra note 88, § 4(c), 8A U.L.A. 109 ("The gift may be made to a specified
donee or without specifying a donee. If the latter, the gift may be accepted by the attending physician as
donee upon or following death."); 1987 UAGA, supra note 85, § 6(b), 8A U.L.A. 53.
90. 1968 UAGA, supra note 88, § 3(4), 8A U.L.A. 106-07 (allowing "any specified individual" to
receive an organ donated to him "for therapy or transplantation"); accord 1987 UAGA, supra note 85,
§ 6(a)(3), 8A U.L.A. 53; see also 1968 UAGA, supra note 88, §§ 3(l)-(3), 8A U.L.A. 106-07 (allowing
any hospital, physician, medical or dental school, college or university, or organ bank to be designated
to receive donated organs for educational or therapeutic use); accord 1987 UAGA, supra note 85,
§§ 6(a)(l)-(2), 8A U.L.A. 53.
91. Id. § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 58.

Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation
A. The Program

When a patient learns that she needs a nonvital organ, her immediate family
members, and sometimes her close friends, are tested to see whether they are
biologically compatible. Currently, the test results for non-compatible

individuals ("potential donors") are simply discarded because their organs
would not be appropriate for transplantation into their loved one. Under a
paired organ exchange system, physicians conducting compatibility
examinations would attempt to obtain the informed consent of non-compatible
potential donors to include their compatibility information in the national
UNOS database, along with the patient's information. 92 Upon receiving a
potential donor's consent, the physician would submit his or her ABO blood
type, MHC antigen information, height, weight, and contact information to
UNOS. Potential donors would be free to decline or to have their information

removed from the system at any time without notice to the patient. The UNOS
database would have to be expanded to accommodate these records.

The database would be configured to search regularly for cross-matches,
wherein a person willing to donate to Patient A is compatible with Patient B,

and a person willing to donate to Patient B is compatible with Patient A. Crossmatches initially would be based strictly on biological compatibility. Only if
cross-matches existed between one donor and several patients would the
existing organ-specific UNOS point systems 93 be utilized to determine which
patient would have the chance to participate in the organ exchange.

Once the database identified a potential exchange, both potential donors
would be contacted without the patients' knowledge. The potential donors
would be asked to submit to further noninvasive testing to ensure
compatibility, 94 and would also be given the opportunity to withdraw from the
exchange and the database. 95 Withholding news of the initial match from the
patient alleviates additional pressure to consent. If the potential donors elected

92. The National Organ Transplantation Task Force found that establishing a registry of donors was
unnecessary. TRANSPLANTATION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 51 ("A national registry of
human organ donors [should] not be established."). Its reasons for this conclusion are applicable only to
registries of people who agree to donate upon death. According to the Task Force Report:
The time between declaration of death and contact with the family usually is quite short. Often
there is no time to query a computer, to find out if the patient is listed. Because so much
emphasis is placed on next-of-kin consent, querying a registry is an unnecessary step. The
costs of maintaining a registry are large and the chances are great that a name could remain in
the registry long after the person is dead.
Id. This reasoning does not counsel against the living donor registries that would be necessary for a
paired organ exchange program.
93. See supra notes 41, 43.
94. See supra Section I.B.
95. A doctor testing a person to determine his suitability for a paired organ exchange would be paid
from the same source that would render payment if the person were being tested for his suitability to
donate directly to a loved one. As discussed earlier, remedying the inequities of the current system for
organ-transplant funding is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra Section II.C.
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to continue, they would be tested for various medical conditions that would
render their organs unsuitable for transplantation or make the organ removal
process particularly dangerous for them. 96 It has also been suggested that each
donor have the opportunity to undergo psychiatric screening to give them yet
another opportunity to withdraw from the exchange "on unspecified medical
grounds." 97 Although this does not appear to be an essential step in the process,
it could be incorporated as a safeguard.
If both donors continue to participate in the exchange and there are no
medical contraindications to donation, the patients would be informed of the
impending donations. Both sets of patients and donors would be required to
sign releases, agreeing not to sue each other if an organ removal or
transplantation attempt is unsuccessful, or any of the parties involved are
injured or killed in the process (this agreement would not, of course, protect the
physicians involved in the operations from medical malpractice or other
standard negligence claims).
The largest logistical obstacle would be ensuring that the transplants occur
at roughly the same time, to prevent a donor from backing out once "his"
patient has received the necessary organ from the other donor. Even if the
donors sign contracts ahead of time, no court is likely to demand specific
performance under the circumstances. 98 An aggrieved patient, or a donor who
has given up an organ, would at best be able to receive damages if the other
donor backed out after one of the transplants occurred. 99

F.T. Rapaport suggested that the organ removals occur in two different
hospitals at the same time. "Each family would be treated at their own
participating transplant center .... with an immediate exchange of the two
kidneys by special courier between the two involved centers, followed by
immediate implantation into the two recipients."'100 Using two hospitals allows
the patients to have the operations performed close to home, minimizing the
inconvenience and expense of travel. It would also allow them to remain in a
more familiar, comfortable environment, closer to family members and friends.
However, this system raises coordination problems by requiring the
physicians at the two hospitals to remain in contact with each other. 10° More
96. See supra Section I.A.
97. See Ross, supra note 13, at 1752.
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3390 ("The following obligations cannot be specifically enforced:
1. An obligation to render personal service; 2. An obligation to employ another in personal service.");
Montaner v. Big Show Prods., 620 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ("Contracts for
employment or personal services should not be enforced by injunction or specific performance. The
appropriate remedy is an action for damages for breach of contract. An injunction to prevent the breach
of a personal services contract is not available.").
99. See id.
100. Rapaport, supranote 13, at 8.
101. Cf Ross, supra note 13, at 1754 ("Our protocol involves only one hospital, which may
simplify the timing of the procedure and communication between the surgical teams.").
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importantly, it unnecessarily introduces an extra variable into the equation-the
two couriers. 'It' somethng happeneu to one of the couricrs, or one of thogans
in transit, the result could be devastating to both its donor as well as its
intended recipient. By having the operations conducted simultaneously at the
same hospital, the chances for mishap are reduced significantly. Nonetheless,
the logistical difficulties involved in arranging for the operations to occur in the
same hospital, or even in two different hospitals at the same time, may be too
great to make this an absolute requirement.
10 2
Neither operation could begin until both donors were under anesthesia.
Donors would have the right to withdraw consent at any point until they were
anesthetized, in which case the exchange would be called off. Once they were
both rendered unconscious, the simultaneous organ removals would begin.
When both organs were removed, they would be transplanted into their
respective recipients.
If, at any point, it appears as if one organ removal will be unsuccessful, the
physician operating on the other donor should be notified immediately.
Although it may not be practicable in all situations, organ removal from one
donor should be terminated if it turns out the other donor's organ cannot be
successfully removed. Undoubtedly, circumstances will occasionally arise in
which the surgeons complete only one of the removals. Although such a
scenario is highly problematic and admits of no easy or satisfactory resolution,
it does not outweigh the benefits offered by a system of paired organ
exchanges, especially in light of the steps that can be taken to minimize the
likelihood of such an occurrence. As noted earlier, the mechanism for paying
the expenses associated with testing potential donors103 and conducting the
transplants would remain the same as under current law.
B. Necessary Statutory andRegulatory Changes

The best way of ensuring that a paired organ exchange system is
established would be to amend 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A), the portion of the
National Organ Transplant Act governing the OPTN registry of patients
requiring organ transplants. This section currently states:
establish in one
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network shall
location or through regional centers(i) a national list of individuals who need organs, and
(ii) a national system, through the use of computers and in accordance with
established medical criteria, to match organs and individuals included in the list,
especially individuals whose immune system makes it difficult for them to receive
102. It is possible that a donor may have a living will or similar document that allows a third party
to make medical decisions on his behalf if he is unconscious or incapacitated. Prior to the operation,
each donor would have to execute a narrowly-tailored document amending his living will to divest his
surrogate decisionmaker of the authority to stop the organ-removal procedure.
103. See supra Section II.C.
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104

added:10 5
I propose that a new provision, 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(iii) be
(iii) a database to facilitate paired organ exchanges.
(I) For each patient on the waiting list specified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 274(b)(2)(A)(i) who is in need of a nonvital organ, this database
shall contain a list of persons who are willing to donate such
nonvital organ to that patient, but who are not compatible with that
patient. For purposes of this section, individuals included in this
database shall be referred to as "potential donors." The list of
donors willing to donate to a particular patient shall be referred to as
that patient's "database listing."
(II) This database shall contain, for each potential donor, contact
information and such organ compatibility information as the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may deem necessary to
identify cross-matches, including but not limited to the potential
donor's ABO blood type, MHC-compatibility information, height,
weight, and age.
(III) This database shall be structured in such a way so as to
facilitate the identification of cross-matches between patients on the
waiting list. For purposes of this section, a "cross-match" is defined
as a group of two patients, where a potential donor in the database
listing for the first patient is biologically compatible with the second
patient, and a potential donor in the database listing for the second
patient is biologically compatible with the first patient. The Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network, shall promulgate
minimum standards, subject to the approval of the Secretary, that
must be met for a potential donor to be deemed "biologically
compatible" with a patient.
(IV) A potential donor may at any time request that he be deleted
from this database; neither having one's information in the database
nor identification in a cross-match shall constitute a binding
agreement to donate an organ.
(V) This database shall be confined to potential donors for patients
in need of kidneys, livers, and other nonvital organs which the
Secretary determines may be donated, in whole or in part, without
impairing a major life function of the donor or jeopardizing his life
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 274(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (1994).
105. Slight grammatical changes to § 274(b)(2)(A) would also be necessary to reflect the addition
of paragraph (iii). Specifically, the 'and' at the end of paragraph (i) would have to be moved to the end
of paragraph (ii).
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or safety beyond the degree of risk normally associated with a
I- cy-rcmoval o

+ro 106

(VI) Notwithstanding any other provision of federal law, paired
organ exchanges as described in this section are permissible. Donor
participants in a paired organ exchange do not receive "valuable
consideration" as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 274e. It shall be a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 274e to offer financial compensation to a
donor to participate in a paired organ exchange under this section,
except that donors may receive compensation for reasonable
medical, travel, housing, and related expenses, and reimbursement
for lost wages, associated with any stage(s) of the paired organ
exchange process (including preliminary medical testing).
It is also possible that a paired organ exchange program could be
established solely through administrative rulemaking, without statutory
changes. The National Organ Transplant Act calls upon the OPTN to "carry out
studies and demonstration projects for the purpose of improving procedures for
organ procurement and allocation"' 0 7 and to "work actively to increase the
supply of donated organs.' 10 8 A paired organ exchange program is one way the
Secretary may specify for the OPTN to implement these requirements.
Moreover, the Secretary has the authority to "make and publish such rules and
regulations" as "may be necessary to the efficient administration" 10 9 of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, which fund many kidney and liver
transplants. 10 The Surgeon General is also empowered to "promulgate all other
regulations necessary to the administration of the [Public Health] Service." 1 '
Existing regulations governing the OPTN are based on these two statutory
provisions.' 12 Thus, whether or not the above legislative recommendations are
implemented, the following rules should be promulgated:
42 C.F.R. § 121.20 For each patient on the waiting list established by
42 C.F.R. § 121.11(a)(1)(i) in need of a nonvital organ, the OPTN
shall maintain a computerized record of all individuals willing to
donate such organ to that patient, but who are not compatible with
him or her ("potential donors"). This record will include each
106. Kidney donation is used here as a benchmark to assess the safety of donating other organs. A
person would not be permitted to become a living donor in a paired organ exchange unless donation of
the organ she wished to donate were at least as safe as kidney donation.
107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(2)(J) (West Supp. 2002).
108. Id. § 274(2)(K).
109. Id. § 1302(a).
110. See id. § 1320b-8 (setting forth criteria that hospitals and OPOs must meet to qualify for
federal reimbursement of certain expenses related to organ transplantation under Medicare and
Medicaid); see also supra Section II.C.
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
112. See42C.F.R.§§ 121.1 to 121.12(2001).
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potential donor's name, mailing address, phone number, e-mail
address, ABO blood type, MHC-compatibility data, height, weight,
and age. "Database," as used in this Subpart, will refer to the
collection of donor records for all patients on the waiting list. A
patient's "database listing," as used in this Subpart, will refer to the
list of potential donors willing to donate a nonvital organ to that
patient.
42 C.F.R. § 121.21
When a person is tested for compatibility with a
patient on the waiting list established by 42 C.F.R. § 121.1 l(a)(1)(i)
by a physician who is affiliated with a hospital or transplant center
that belongs to the OPTN, or is serviced by an OPO that belongs to
the OPTN, such physician shall ask if that person wishes to be
included in the database listing for that patient. If the person agrees,
the physician shall forward the information about the person
specified in 42 C.F.R. § 121.20 to the OPTN, which shall promptly
enter it into the database. The OPTN shall periodically contact each
potential donor in the database to request that they notify the OPTN
of any upcoming changes in their contact information.
42 C.F.R. § 121.22 A potential donor may at any time request that
his information be removed from the database by contacting either
the OPTN or the physician who initially forwarded his information
to the OPTN. In no case shall the patient be notified when a
potential donor removes himself from that patient's database listing,
nor may a patient examine his database listing of potential donors.
42 C.F.R. § 123.23
Each week, the OPTN will search the database
for cross-matches. As used in this section, a "cross-match" is
defined as a group of two patients, where a potential donor in the
database listing for the first patient is compatible with the second
patient, and a potential donor in the database listing for the second
patient is compatible with the first patient.
42 C.F.R. § 123.24 The OPTN shall issue guidelines, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, for
determining the minimum criteria which must be met for a patient to
be considered "compatible" with a potential donor for purposes of
this Subpart, taking into account ABO-compatibility, MHCcompatibility (for kidney transplants), the relative height and weight
of the patient and potential donor, and such other factors as the
OPTN may determine to be medically appropriate.
42 C.F.R. § 123.25 When a cross-match is identified, the OPTN shall
notify the two compatible donors, again informing them of their
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right to be removed from the database. Such notice shall also
rcqucst that they contact the physician who conducted their initiln
compatibility testing for any further testing which needs to be
conducted to ensure medical compatibility.
42 C.F.R. § 123.26 If both donors in a cross-match consent to further
testing, they must be found to be compatible with their intended
recipients, and free of diseases or other medical conditions that
would either render their organs unsuitable for transplantation (as
determined by the OPTN, subject to the approval of the Secretary),
or make the removal procedure unusually dangerous as compared to
the average nephrectomy. If these criteria are met for both donors,
the patients with whom the donors are affiliated in the database may
be notified, and the patients' transplant centers may arrange for a
paired organ exchange in accordance with these regulations.
42 C.F.R. § 123.27 Either donor may withdraw consent to a paired
organ exchange at any time prior to being anesthetized for the organ
removal operation. Prior to the organ removal operations, each
donor must revoke any documents that have the effect of vesting
legal authority in a third party to revoke consent to a procedure such
as this once the donor is unconscious.
42 C.F.R. § 123.28 Removal of organs from living donors paired
through a cross-match under this Subpart shall occur as close to
simultaneously as reasonably possible, consistent with the safety of
the donors. Removal of organs from both donors, and
transplantation into recipients, shall occur in the same transplant
center, whenever reasonably possible.
42 C.F.R. § 123.29 Costs associated with transplants performed
under this section shall be reimbursed under existing applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions.
42 C.F.R. § 123.30 A donor participating in a paired organ exchange
does not receive "valuable consideration" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 274e. Donors involved in a paired organ exchange may be
reimbursed for reasonable medical, travel, housing, and related
expenses, as well as lost wages, associated with any stage(s) of the
paired organ exchange process (including preliminary medical
testing).
C. ProhibitionsAgainst Organ Selling
42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) provides, "It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
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consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce. ' ' 1 3 Individuals violating this provision "shall be fined not more
than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."' 1 4 The term
"human organ" is defined as including, among other things, kidneys and livers,
as well as any other organ, or any "subpart" thereof, specified by the
Secretary. 115 The statute does not define "valuable consideration," except to
note that it "does not include the reasonable payments associated with the
removal, transplantation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality
control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and
lost wages incurred by 6the donor of a human organ in connection with the
donation of the organ.""
Although the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) prohibits the
sale of organs, it does so only if "the removal of the [body] part is intended to
occur after the death of the decedent."' 17 It "does not cover the sale by living
donors if removal is intended to occur before death." ' 1 8 The 1968 version of the
UAGA did not contain any prohibitions on organ sales." 9 Thus, § 274e(a) of
the National Organ Transplantation Act is the only prohibition relevant to
paired organ exchanges.
There is no indication that Congress intended to disallow paired organ
exchanges through this prohibition. Nonetheless, because a donor in a paired
organ exchange trades his organ for a compatible organ for his loved one, some
may argue that the donor receives "valuable consideration." ' 12 To avoid
problems under this provision, I recommend that Congress enact my proposed
42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(iii)(VI), which excludes paired organ exchanges from
the scope of § 274e. Even in the absence of congressional action, paired organ
exchanges can be permissible if the Department of Health and Human Services
issues an interpretive rule, such as my proposed 42 C.F.R. § 123.30, stating that
the phrase "valuable consideration" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) does not
include any rights obtained pursuant to a paired organ exchange agreement.
One can also make the somewhat unorthodox claim that interpreting
§ 274e(a) so as to prohibit paired organ exchanges would raise serious

113. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994).
114. Id. § 274e(b).
115. Id. § 274e(c)(1).
116. Id. § 274e(c)(2).
117. 1987 UAGA, supra note 85, § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 58.
118. Id. § 10(a) cmt., 8A U.L.A. 59.
119. 1968 UAGA, supra note 88, 8A U.L.A. 63.
120. See Carlisle v. T & R Excavating, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that,
to constitute consideration, "a benefit need not even be actual, as in the nature of a profit, or be as
economically valuable as whatever the promisor promises in exchange for the benefit; it need only be
something regarded by the promisor as beneficial enough to induce his promise"); Steinberg v. Chicago
Med. Sch. 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (I11.
1977) ("Any act or promise which is of benefit to one party or
disadvantage to the other is a sufficient consideration to support a contract.").
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constitutional difficulties. The Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects
not only speecn, 12 1 but "expressive conduct" as well. Expressive condutIs
generally defined as any act "intend[ed] to convey a particularized message...
[where] in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."' 22 Organ donation is
commonly viewed as a symbolic act deeply infused with social meaning; as
discussed later in this Note,' 23 many commentators view organ donation as a
critical and distinctive means of altruistically expressing one's connection with
and concern for others. 124 "[G]ifts of the body such as blood, tissues, and
organs are an important and powerful way in which we affirm our relationships
with other members of our community." 125 While selling one's organs does not
convey such messages, participating in a paired organ exchange is a unique
expression of love and devotion to a family member or close friend. Sacrificing
part of one's body to save the life of a loved one is incomparably meaningful.
Thus, given the deep social and personal meaning of such acts, a general
prohibition on the receipt of "valuable consideration" for donating an organ
26
might be unconstitutional as applied to paired organ exchanges.'

121. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... ).
122. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). This requirement for a "particularlized
message" was subsequently loosened by the Court, which held "[A] narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
'particularized message,' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Amold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll." Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (internal citation omitted). For a discussion of the
Court's expressive conduct doctrine and its application to particular activities, see Michael T. Morley,
Comment, "'Extremely Vexed and Difficult, " Games and the First Amendment, 112 YALE L.J. 361
(2002).
123. See infra Section V.B.
124. James F. Blumstein, Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY, supra note 81, at 5, 28 (noting that the current cadaveric organ procurement
system is based on "a total commitment to the purported benefits of communitarian expressions of
solidarity through families' choosing to donate the organs of their next of kin at the time of death");
Crespi, supra note 10, at 22 ("[The willingness to donate an organ is regarded as a high expression of
altruism and communitarian sentiment ... ").
125.
Thomas H. Murray, Altruism and Health Care: What Community Shall We Be?, in
ALTRUISM, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH CARE 67, 71 (Anders Nordgren & Claes-Goran Westrin eds., 1998)
(citing Roberta G. Simmons, Altruism and Sociology, 32 SOC. Q. 1 (1991)).
126. The Supreme Court set forth the four-prong test for evaluating restrictions on expressive
conduct in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which it held,
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it firthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. Interpreting a ban on organ selling so as to apply to paired organ exchanges may be
permissible under the first three prongs of the O'Brien test. However, banning paired organ exchanges is
unlikely to be "essential" to furthering whatever goals the government may seek to promote by a general
prohibition on offering consideration to organ donors. See infra Part V.
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IV. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PAIRED ORGAN EXCHANGES

A paired organ exchange program ultimately depends on acceptance of two
fundamental moral principles. First, it must be possible for an individual to give
informed consent to donate a non-vital organ. Second, a living donor must be
able to specify the intended recipient of his gift. Although these ideas underlie
our existing system of voluntary living organ donation, they have been
challenged in recent years. While a thorough discussion of these principles is
beyond the scope of this Note, this Part discusses why objections to them are
unpersuasive.
A. The Legitimacy of Consent

In most situations, a physician is required to obtain a patient's informed
consent before initiating a medical procedure such as organ donation.12 7 The
principle of informed consent is a cornerstone of medical ethics,' and is
essential for respecting patient autonomy. 129 It has been suggested that this
ideal of voluntary consent cannot be achieved with regard to living organ
donation because of the inherently coercive nature of situations where a parent,
sibling, or child is in dire need of an organ. Joel D. Kallich and Jon F. Merz
most forcefully expounded this position in The Transplant Imperative:
Protecting Living Donors From the Pressure to Donate.130 They argued that

many donors do not consent voluntarily to organ donation because their
submission to the procedure stems primarily from
the fact that they "may not
31
be able to deal with the guilt of not donating."'

Kallich and Merz began with the observation that "[t]he potential [organ]
recipient, family members, and even physicians or other health care providers
(e.g., procurement coordinators) may exert subtle (and not so subtle) pressures
on a potential donor."' 132 They went on to reference the "'altruistic' social
mores that govern family social behavior," and claimed that "many people in
the transplant community are naively unaware of the coercive power of these
mores and how living donors often do not have a 'free' choice not to volunteer
127. Norman Fost, Waived Consentfor Emergency Research, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 173-74
(1998) (citing informed consent as "a cultural norm," and explaining the exceptions to this general
requirement).
128. BENEDICT ASHLEY & KEVIN O'ROURKE, ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE: AN INTRODUCTORY

TEXTBOOK 38 (1994) ("To protect the basic need of all persons for health care and their primary
responsibility for their own health, no physical or psychological therapy may be administered to them
without their free and informed consent.").
129. See Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Wis. 1975) ("The right to
be recognized and protected is the right of the patient to consent or not to consent to a proposed medical
treatment or procedure.").
130. Joel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The TransplantImperative: ProtectingLiving Donorsfrom the
Pressureto Donate, 20 J. CORP. L. 139 (1994).
131. Id.at 153.
132. Id.at 143.
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to donate an organ."'

' 33

They stated:
[S]ocial mores of the family dictate that all members should offer to donate their
organs to help another family member. Violating this norm entails substantial and
likely penalties that few would endure willingly, such as excommunication from
134 the
entire family unit. The potential for such familial sanctions clearly is coercive.
According to Kallich and Merz, family members are not the only source of

undue influence. Physicians must "develop mechanisms to assure that no
pressures are created from outside the family. It is clearly unethical for care
givers (i.e., physicians and nurses), either by appearance
or fact, to add to the
135
donate."'
to
pressure
overwhelming
potentially
already
This is by no means an isolated claim; others have maintained that simply
by informing potential donors that organs from living donors lead to much
higher recipient survival rates than those from cadavers, physicians
impermissibly pressure patients to consent. 136 Bioethicist Arthur Caplan writes:
[M]any critics of live donation worry that the environment in which live donation
takes place makes it impossible for anyone to give free and voluntary consent.
Family members will often feel extraordinary pressure to 'volunteer.' The
realization that one could be blamed for the failure to help a spouse, a sibling, or a
child may be so frightening that potential donors see themselves as having no
choice.... [Flamily 37
members may feel overwhelmed by the pressure to then
'volunteer' as donors.'
One commentator went so far as to argue that "individuals who
'voluntarily' decide to donate a kidney to a relative may be subject to greater
coercion than those who sell their organs .. . . Donors often describe their
choice as 'necessary' and family members may even openly pressure them to
donate." 138 This "pressure" is described as "subtle coercion."' 39 The question is

often presented, "[H]ow can a parent be expected to make an informed,
uncoerced, free choice when asked to consider donating an organ to his/her
dying child? In this emotionally charged arena, there is a fine line between
asking for the donation, and compelling the parent to donate."' 4 °
Itis difficult to pinpoint exactly why these commentators question the
legitimacy of consent under such circumstances. An implicit assumption in

some of these arguments is that consent is not freely tendered if the donor is
motivated by something other than an inherent desire to act as a donor or to
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Jd. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 153.
Fox & SWAZEY, supranote 17, at 33.
Arthur L. Caplan, Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law: Am I My

Brother'sKeeper?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (1993).
138. Note, supra note 14, at 1034.
139. Id.
140. R.W. Busuttil, Living-Related Liver Donation: CON, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 43, 44
(1991).

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 21:221, 2003

help the potential recipient. That is, if the donor is primarily driven by the
desire to avoid the "guilt of not donating,"' 4 1 her consent is not freely given.
However, such guilt would likely stem from the fact that the potential donor
feels, at least in part, that morality requires one to donate a nonvital organ when
necessary to save the life of a family member. This reveals a fundamental flaw
in the critics' arguments. A patient is not coerced into a decision when she acts
in accordance with her personal moral beliefs. The guilt that would stem from
not donating would be a result of her violating these beliefs; acting so as to
avoid such feelings of guilt is evidence of autonomy, not coercion.
Another theme common to these arguments is that it is wrong for family
members to pressure a potential donor into consenting. 42 Some bioethicists
feel that legitimate familial influence crosses the line from desirable to
impermissible when the potential donor would likely be "excommunicat[ed]"
from the family should he refuse to consent. 143 It is not clear that such external
pressures to donate constitute coercion.
There are two ways to conceptualize coercion. First, coercion is any
application of pressure to "convince" an actor to perform an act he otherwise
would not perform. When used in this context, one can say things like
"Coercion by the state to prevent tortious harms and contract breaches is
legitimate."' 144 This sense of the word, however, is morally uninformative; we
would need a separate moral theory to help us determine whether a particular
act of coercion is permissible or not.
The commentators discussed above implied that coercion is intrinsically
wrong. Thus, they used the term in a second, morally informative (or
normative) sense which connotes not only that an actor is being pressured to
perform a certain act, but that the pressure is unjustified or immoral. This
understanding of coercion most clearly applies where the person making a

141.
142.

Kallich & Merz, supra note 130, at 153.
Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the Supply of

Transplantable Organs, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 424 (1985) ("[Flamily members may be under subtle
or not so subtle pressure from other relatives or from the potential recipient."). Some commentators
believe that
no matter what efforts the medical team may make to protect the members of a prospective
recipient's family from feeling coerced or self-coerced, the pressure to offer this gift of life is
powerful. Above and beyond the medical reasons that favor a live kidney donation, its
symbolic meaning virtually obliges every family member at least to consider making such a
gift.
Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 17, at 33.
143. Kallich & Merz, supra note 130, at 146; see also Russell Scott, The Terrible Imbalance:
Human Organs and Tissuesfor Therapy-A Review of Demand and Supply, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.

& POL'Y 139, 143 (1993) ("[P]rocurement of tissues from living donors can raise issues concerning
human dignity, undue influences, [and] family pressure upon a family member to donate.").
144. Charles K. Rowley, Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and Economics: A Social Choice
Analysis, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 971, 976 (1998); see also American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,
243 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] State is enforcing its 'law'
when it brings coercive power to bear on a party who has violated a contractual obligation.").
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threat does not have the right to perform the specified act. For instance, a
mugger who threatens 'o shoot a vi.tcs
coe,
urcively in the normative sense

because he does not have the right to carry through with his threat.
When family members threaten to shun a relative who is compatible with a
close relative yet refuses to donate, they are fully within their legal and moral
rights. Indeed, it would be strange to argue that a person has an ethical duty to

associate with someone-even a family member-with whom that person has
serious moral differences (especially when they entail major practical
consequences), or whom that person feels has neglected an important moral
duty. 145 The mere fact that others severely disapprove of an act or omission,
and take steps to distance themselves from the actor, cannot be said to
constitute coercion in the normative sense. Were this the case, then a free
society would be possible only if we stifled our moral opinions and maintained
interpersonal relationships regardless of fundamental ethical disagreements.
If the means by which family members exert pressure ("excommunication") are not morally prohibited, then we must question whether
their goals or motives are immoral. I do not believe it inappropriate for a family
to try to save the life of one of its members, nor do I feel it wrong for a family
to expect its members to be willing to undergo the small risk of a transplant
operation to accomplish this goal. The preservation of life is of critical
importance 146 and the close relationship that generally exists between family
members 147 makes a threat to the health of one person a matter of grave

concern for the rest of the family. Empirically,
this
•148 seems to be the attitude with
which many families approach organ donation.
The primary remaining argument is that the threat of ex-communication is
coercive because the only choice the actor can reasonably make is to donate;

the actor's primary alternative to donation leaves him significantly worse off.
145. It should also be remembered that the choice as to whether to "maintain certain intimate
human relationships" is a "fundamental element of personal liberty." Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). When a family member refuses to donate an organ to a loved one, she
undermines the "special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs" that underlies her family; she
acts in apparent disregard of the "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals" to whom she is so bound. Id. at 619-20.
146. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1029 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that
the prevention of "loss of life and limb" is "a legitimate, indeed compelling state interest").
147. 1 limit myself to situations involving relatively strong bonds between family members,
because in the absence of such relationships, "ex-communication" would not have such allegedly
coercive force.
148. According to one study,
a remarkable proportion of family members were willing to undergo a very serious and-at
least temporarily-debilitating operation in order to benefit their son or daughter, mother or
father, sister or brother. Perhaps even more remarkable was the speed with which the decision
typically was made. People did not hesitate for the most part. The answer in most cases was a
virtually instantaneous "yes."
Murray, supra note 125, at 72; Fehrman-Ekholm, supra note 53, at 2070 (finding that "[t]he great
majority (86%) [of living donors] reported that they made the decision [to donate] by themselves... It
is reassuring that very few regretted the donation (0.8%).").
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Such "lesser-of-two-evils" situations are not inherently coercive in the
normative sense; indeed, we frequently face them in everyday life. People pay
thousands of dollars in taxes to avoid the far worse consequence of spending
years in jail. While this may be coercive in the morally uninformative sense of
the word discussed above, few would argue that it is coercive in the normative
sense discussed here. To determine whether a decision is coerced in this latter
sense, we need to know not only the array of possible choices facing an actor,
but also the moral justifications offered by those who are influencing the
ultimate decision.
Thus, when a ship comes across a man stranded on an uncharted desert
island in the middle of the ocean and offers to take him home for $10 million,
and there is no reasonable prospect of another ship coming in the foreseeable
future, we have no problem concluding that the situation is normatively
coercive. Not only does the stranded man have only one reasonable choice, but
the ship's captain also is immorally attempting to exploit his situation.
Although this is patently unrealistic, if for some reason it actually cost $10
million for the ship to stop, take on an extra passenger, and deliver that
passenger back to the mainland, the captain's motives and goals no longer seem
ignoble, and the situation is no longer normatively coercive; it is just a case of
tough luck.
It is impossible to condemn external pressures being brought to bear on a
decision by terming them normatively coercive without making the admittedly
subjective judgments about whether the person creating the external pressure
has the moral right to commit the threatened act, and whether that person has
immoral goals or motives. Organ donation is a life-or-death choice; I believe
that, in most cases, family members act reasonably in treating a refusal to
donate as a serious breach of familial obligations. The fact that such
considerations may make donation the clearly preferable course of action does
not make the choice coercive or detract from the voluntariness of the ultimate
decision; even when there's only one reasonable choice, it can still be selected
voluntarily.
B. Directed Giving
Some scholars have criticized the idea of "designated organ donation,"
wherein a donor is able to specify the recipient of his donated organ. Such
commentators argue that for a person to donate an organ to any recipient other
than the next compatible person on the waiting list is immoral. The rationale
behind this claim is that donated organs are communal resources to be allocated
according to publicly established criteria, and not private property to be
bestowed upon an individual of the donor's choosing. According to the
National Organ Transplantation Task Force:
Organs are donated on behalf of all potential recipients; this implies that the organ
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is to be used for the good of the community, and ultimately the community must
decide what best serves the public interest .... [Slurgeons and organ procurement
...
149
agencies should view themselves as stewards or trustees of this resource.

The Task Force went on to state, "[O]rgans are donated by individuals for the
good of the public as a whole." 150 Others have maintained that once a donor
"has decided to give, the donation is subject to the constraints of equality and
justice. This means that if it really is given-if it really is to be used as an
organ-it does become
part of the pool whose distribution must adhere to these
15
ethical principles." 1
The most common situations in which such objections arise are "life
appeals," where a particularly photogenic individual, usually a child
surrounded by loving family members, makes a highly publicized plea for an
organ. Life appeals that result in a designated donation "undercut[] the notion
of organs as belonging to 'the community.' These recurring situations raise
questions about whether organ procurers or the family of a cadaver donor
should have the 'distributional authority' to stipulate who shall receive the gift
'1 52
being made."
Some commentators have gone so far as to argue that individuals who
accept designated organ donations (as opposed to waiting for organs distributed
according to UNOS criteria) are stealing from other patients on the list.
[T]he individual [patient] cannot request a designated donation, and when
designated as recipient with or without such a request, he or she cannot accept. He
or she must gently reject the offer, that is, without denigrating the laudable
153 spirit
that underlies the donation as a donation .... But reject it he or she must.

To do otherwise would deprive of that organ whomever would have received it
according to the waiting list criteria; "[t]o accept a designated donation is to
interfere in the distribution pattern and to take something that, all other things
being equal, someone else should have."' 154 Consequently, "if the designated
recipient accepts the organ in violation of these [principles], he or she will be
committing theft." 155

149.

TRANSPLANTATION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 86. James Childress has

explained,
From this perspective, organ procurement and transplant teams receive donated organs as
trustees and stewards for the community as a whole, and they should determine who will
receive available organs according to public criteria that have been developed by a publicly
accountable body with public representation and that reflect principles of justice as well as
medical standards.
James Childress, Ethical Criteriafor Procuringand DistributingOrgansfor Transplantation,in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY, supra note 81, at 87, 102.
150. TRANSPLANTATION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 104.
151. Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social Context, in

LIFE CHOICES, supranote 17, at 503, 515.
152. Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 17, at 79.
153. Kluge, supra note 151, at 514-15.
154. Id. at 515.

155. Id.
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Notwithstanding these criticisms, I believe that directed organ donation is
morally permissible. Nothing belongs to an individual so much as his own
body. "The rights to possess, use and exclude others from one's body while one
is alive are all relatively evident."'1 56 This concept "of the body as a form of
property possessed by its 'owner' dates back at least to John Locke, whose
influential theory of property derived all ownership from the property
possessed by individuals in their own persons."' 57 As a prima facie matter, it
seems reasonable to believe that a person has the right to control the disposition
of his own body. It is not immediately apparent why this right does not apply
(at least while he is alive) to a part of his body, such as an organ, that has
become disconnected from the rest of him. Indeed, none of the commentators
discussed above explain how or why an organ becomes community property
upon its separation from a donor's body.
A person's claim to control the disposition of his organs is bolstered by the
fact that, in order to have them removed, he must submit to an invasive surgical
procedure that carries with it the small but real chance of injury or death. Far
from dissipating his right to maintain control over his body parts, a person who
undergoes the risk and inconvenience of the organ removal process solidifies
his right to designate a recipient for the organ. It seems contrary to notions of
"just desert" to deny a person who has submitted to an intrusive medical
procedure to make an organ available for transplantation the opportunity to
designate the beneficiary of his endeavors. Were expropriation of organs
permitted, the public would receive the benefits of donation by allocating
organs according to communally developed criteria, but the costs would be
concentrated on the minority of donors.
As a practical matter, prohibiting directed donation would be disastrous for
organ procurement from living donors. Very few living donors give their
organs to strangers. If donors were not permitted to direct their gift to a
particular patient, the overwhelming majority would decline to donate. Thus, a
ban on directed giving would result in many more avoidable deaths. While
altruism may be a desirable social goal,158 mankind's generosity extends only
so far. The goal of any realistic organ procurement and allocation policy should
be to take people as they are and figure out acceptable ways to maximize the
number of lives saved.
V. OBJECTIONS TO COMPENSATION

As noted earlier, in the absence of statutory or regulatory amendments, it is
possible that a paired organ exchange system would run afoul of the federal law

156. Jaffe, supra note 6, at 545.

157. Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy,and the Human Body, 80 B.U.L. REV. 359, 367 (2000).
158. See infra Section V.B.
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prohibiting organ donors from receiving "valuable consideration" for their
donation.! 59 Because the donor in a paired organ exchange would be nroviding

his organ in order to obtain a compatible organ for his loved one, it can be
argued that the donor is receiving consideration for his act.
Most major medical organizations have taken strong positions against
compensation for organ donors. 160 Many of the common objections to
compensation, however, apply solely to financial incentives and are
inapplicable to paired organ exchanges. Concerns that the poor will be

exploited or coerced, 161 that the quality of available organs will drop, 162 or that
159. See supra Section III.C.
160. See World Health Organization, Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation,337
LANCET 1470, 1470 (1991) ("The human body and its parts cannot be the subject of commercial
transactions. Accordingly, giving or receiving payment (including any other compensation or reward)
for organs should be prohibited."); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 2.15, at 50-51 (2002-03) ("[II t is
not ethical to participate in a procedure to enable a living donor to receive payment, other than for the
reimbursement of expenses necessarily incurred in connection with removal, for any of the donor's nonrenewable organs."); Council of the Transplantation Society, Commercialisation [sic] in
Transplantation: The Problems and Some Guidelines for Practice, 1985 LANCET 715, 716 ("No
transplant surgeon/team shall be involved directly or indirectly in the buying or selling of organs/tissues
or in any transplant activity aimed at commercial gain to himself/herself or an associated hospital or
institute."); TRANSPLANTATION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 9-10 ("The Task Force
condemns commercialization of organ transplantation and the exploitation of living unrelated
donors ....Transplanting kidneys from living unrelated donors should be prohibited when financial
gain rather than altruism is the motivating factor.... [S]tates should prohibit the sale of organs from
cadavers or living donors .... ").
Recently, however, several groups have indicated a willingness to revisit the issue. See, e.g., Bruce
Jaspen, AMA: Study Payingfor Organ Donation, CHI. TiB., June 19, 2002, at Business, I ("[T]he
American Medical Association on Tuesday said it would support studies to determine whether money
should be used to motivate potential donors and their families."); Sean Salai, Group Seeks Study on
Money for Organs, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at A 12 (discussing the UNOS vote "to lobby Congress
for studies on purchasing organs from relatives of the recently deceased"); Editorial, Dealingfor Organ
Donors, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 1, 2002, at 6A ("The American Society of Transplant Surgeons
earlier this year also decided to support some forms of incentive, such as charitable contributions on
behalf of the donor or small sums to help with funeral expenses. But the group opposed outright cash
payments or tax breaks for the estates of donors.").
161. Lori Andrews, My Body, My Property, in LIFE CHOICES, supra note 17, at 463, 470
("Congress and some state legislatures have already decided to prohibit payment [for organs] out of fear
that poor, minority, or otherwise vulnerable people will be coerced to exchange body parts for money.");
Coleman, supra note 14, at 16-17 ("Because many poor people worry about how their families will
survive after they die, donations might not be completely voluntary. Instead, fear about their families'
welfare-rather than a wish to donate-may coerce consent.").
This ubiquitous argument overlooks several key points. First, as discussed earlier, donating a kidney
or a portion of a liver poses very little short- or long-term risk to the donor. See supra Section I.D.
Indeed, compensated organ donation is far safer than many jobs we already allow people-both rich and
poor-to perform. "The risk to a healthy thirty-five-year-old in donating a kidney is the same as the risk
in driving a car sixteen miles every working day." Andrews, supra, at 471. As one commentator has
argued:
It is hard to see how kidney sales from living donors differ in more than degree, if even in that,
from a host of other unpleasant, degrading, and dangerous, but legal activities, such as boxing,
coal mining, lumbering, cleaning toilets, or collecting garbage, that people engage in because
of the remuneration.
Cohen, supra note 10, at 29; Laurence E. Karp & Roger P. Donahue, PreimplantationEctogenesis:
Science and Speculation Concerning In Vitro Fertilizationand Related Procedures, 124 WEST. J.MED.
282, 295 (1976) (arguing, in the context of commercial surrogacy, "it seems inconsistent to categorically
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163
existing disparities in access to organs for transplantation will be widened

are inapplicable to a system where the only "compensation" the donor receives

is saving the life of a loved one.
Nonetheless, there are two objections to compensating organ donors that
extend beyond financial incentives, potentially embracing paired organ
exchanges. Section A addresses the claim that even non-financial compensation
may lead people to commodify their bodies by viewing body parts as goods to

be bartered. Section B discusses the argument that any form of compensation
for organ donors is objectionable because it is inconsistent with the altruism
that is supposed to underlie our nation's organ procurement system.

deny such women this kind of livelihood while we permit and even encourage people to earn money by
such dangerous means as coal mining, or racing little cars around a track at 200 miles per hour").
Moreover, this objection to compensation is at best shortsighted, and at worse hypocritical:
[Blanning payment on ethical grounds to prevent such scenarios overlooks one important fact:
to the person who needs money to feed his children or to purchase medical care for her parent,
the option of not selling a body part is worse than the option of selling it. Society has not
benefited individuals by banning organ sales unless it also provides a means to escape
desperate conditions.
Andrews, supra, at 470; B.M. Dickens, Human Rights and Commerce in Health Care, 22
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 904, 904 (1990) ("Prohibition of sales, purchases, and markets is proposed for
[indigents'] protection, although this itself is a poor response since it does nothing to relieve poverty.").
162. See, e.g., Cates, supra note 17, at 36 ("This fear centres [sic] around the belief that the poor,
indigent, malnourished, or alcoholic will make up the largest proportion of the new class of donors, and
that people in these groups will misrepresent their medical condition in order to qualify for the potential
monetary rewards of organ donation."). Arguments along these lines are often based on Richard
Titmuss's research regarding blood procurement policies. Comparing the quality of the blood supply in
America, where the sale of blood was permitted, to Britain, where it was prohibited, he found that
"[c]ommercial blood-bank systems waste blood, and shortages, acute and chronic, characterize the
demand-and-supply position.... [T]he risk of transfusing contaminated blood is greater if the blood is
obtained by a commercial source." Richard Titmuss, Why Give to Strangers?, 1971 LANCET 123, 124. It
seems likely, however, that such concerns could be addressed through rigorous donor screening.
163. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 26 ("Many believe that certain basic and bare necessities of life
and health . . . should be available to all regardless of ability and willingness to pay. If there is an
insufficient quantity for all to obtain the minimum, then allocation should not be on the basis of
purchasing power."); Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, Note, The United States System of
Organ Donation, the InternationalSolution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: 'And the Winner
Is... ', 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 37 (1994) (stating that the availability of transplants "should not be a function of
the financial ability to buy organs"). As many commentators have noted, however, organ markets need
not be entirely laissez-faire. Were the government to procure organs through financial payments to
donors, it could allocate them according to existing UNOS criteria, which does not take into account
ability to pay. See Dickens, supra note 161, at 905 ("If the purchaser was the state, which allocated the
resource [organs] on an equitable basis such as medical need, proximity of death or prospect of recovery
that did not improperly favour the rich, payment might be less objectionable."). Even absent a statesponsored organ-purchase program, the fact remains that
doctors' services, hospital services, and drugs will probably always account for most of the
cost of a transplant. Thus, those who would be unable to pay for a transplant if there were a
charge for the organ would generally also be unable to pay for it without such a charge.
Moreover, it is not clear why distributional concerns call for the organs themselves to be
allocated on a nonmarket basis while these other items are priced on a commercial basis.
Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY, supra note 81, at 57, 80.
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A. Preventing Commodfication

Many academics argue that certain things are "market inalienable"-they
should not be traded or bartered in open markets.' 64 Critics believe that, by

attempting to commercialize something that is market inalienable, the seller
65

would be "selling something so precious that no man should part with it."'
Another variation of this argument is that "one may not purport to sell what

cannot be sold, for in the very process of sale that which is purportedly sold is
transformed and its value is destroyed or diminished. ' ' 166 Such commodification
is seen as inherently immoral. 167 This argument is motivated by the same

impulse that leads many people to condemn commercial surrogacy.168
Some people who object to compensation on these grounds reject the idea

of "putting a price tag" on organs. "The presence of a monetary price or tariff

for a service once considered to be beyond price is seen to debase the service,
and reduce it from a priceless gift given as a token of love, esteem and
dedication to a mere incident of commerce."' 69 The commodification objection
extends beyond financial incentives, however. To view something as a
commodity is to see it as something to be exchanged for something of greater
use or value; it is to perceive the object being bartered as instrumentally

valuable for its trading potential. While no money changes hands in a paired
organ exchange, the heart of the concept is still based on a bargain.

I do not believe that concerns over commodification are a legitimate basis
for opposing paired organ exchanges. First, while it is incontrovertibly wrong
to commodify a human being, I am not persuaded that individual parts of a
person's body merit the same ethical status as the person as a whole. Our
internal organs are essentially biological machines that perform functions
necessary for our survival. While we need them to live, they are not important
parts of who we are. They are not intertwined with one's consciousness,

personality, memory, or anything else connected to individuality. Although a
164. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1850 (1987)
("Something that is market-inalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system means it is not to
be traded in the market.").
165. Cohen, supra note 10, at 26; Cherry, supra note 51, at 4 ("The emerging consensus against a
for-profit market in human organs is marked by a view that organs should not be treated as
commodities.").
166. Cohen, supra note 10, at 26 (emphasis in original).
167. Crespi, supra note 10, at 22 ("Allowing organ sales necessarily places a monetary value on
parts of the human body. To some commentators, this is a major step towards subjecting persons to the
depersonalizing influence of market rhetoric, and constitutes a 'commodification' of an object that
should be held sacred and above market bartering.").
168. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets, and Valuation, 61 BROOKLYN L. REv. 657, 687 (1995)
("The commercial surrogate mother, in selling her reproductive capabilities, commodifies and thereby
degrades both herself and the child or children she produces.").
169. Bernard M. Dickens, Moral andLegal Markets in TransplantableOrgans, 2 HEALTH L.J. 121,
130 (1994); Crespi, supra note 10, at 22 ("The human body and its constituent organs are argued to be
literally 'priceless' and incommensurable with the normal articles of commerce.").
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liver or kidney may be a part of a person's body, it is not part of that person.
These amalgamations of cells have none of the features of human beings that
are thought to bestow intrinsic value. Thus, our instinctive revulsion to
commodifying people is not easily extended to internal organs.
Second, a theme that underlies many commodification arguments is that
trading certain types of things (such as human organs) is an act of disrespect
because, given the nature of that which you are trading, whatever you receive
in return cannot possibly be of comparable value. Such a trade would falsely
imply that an organ is of equivalent value to the item received in exchange for
it. From this perspective, the central focus of the commodification thesis is not
the trade itself, but the "cheapening" or irreverence implied by the exchange.
A paired organ exchange, however, is truly an exchange of equivalents: the
gift of life is traded for something of equal value. Even if organs are thought to
be of special moral importance and deserving of heightened respect, a paired
organ exchange manifests the appropriate appreciation for the values
implicated by the transaction. Such an exchange hardly involves the type of
devaluation of the human body to which an outright market could give rise.
Third, in light of First Amendment constraints on the government's
lawmaking powers, the commodification objection is not a constitutionally
legitimate basis for laws banning organ sales or exchanges. While there are
many other justifications that can support such measures, the belief that these
acts improperly commodify or show insufficient respect for the human 1body
70
may not be used as the basis for a prohibition due to the First Amendment.
Selling one's organs would generally not be considered a form of
expressive conduct; people do not engage in such transactions in order to
communicate an idea.' 7 1 However, when the government seeks to prohibit such
sales to prevent commodification, the government is claiming that such acts do
have an expressive component-they express disrespect for the human body
and convey the actor's view that the body is a commodity subject to market
exchanges. Indeed, banning such sales out of concerns about commodification
prohibits this conduct precisely because of the message it conveys. Laws that
regulate acts because the government finds the ideas they express to be

170. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... "). Of course, the fact that a few legislators might have been motivated to vote for such a law
due to such concerns is not a basis for invalidating it. See United State v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384
(1968) ("What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what
motivates scores of others to enact it .... We decline to void [a law] ... which could be reenacted in its
exact form is the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it."). My argument is simply
that the government is not permitted to argue that preventing commodification is a justification for a ban
on organ selling or paired organ exchanges, were such a ban to be challenged in court.
171. Although, as I argued earlier, participating in a paired organ exchange to save the life of the
loved one may be seen as a moving symbolic gesture expressing love and devotion. See supra notes
12 1-126 and accompanying text.
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repugnant are subject to strict scrutiny under the Speech Clause.
Consider, for example, Spence v. Washington, wherein the Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that prohibited people from superimposing peace
signs or other symbols in front of an American flag. 173 The Court ruled that if
the government interest at stake in prohibiting Spence's conduct was
"preserving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country," then it "is
directly related to expression," and subject to strict scrutiny.' 74 Moreover, the
Court stated that people may not
"be punished for failing to show proper
175
respect for our national emblem."'
The Court reaffirmed this approach in Texas v. Johnson, the famous flagburning case, stressing "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.', 1 76 It
went on to declare, "[N]othing in our precedents suggests that a State may
foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to
177
it.'
The Court further held,

The State's argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or
spoken words and nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we have shown, is of no
moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is 17here,
and where the
8
regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it is here.

This doctrine is by no means limited to cases involving the American flag.
In R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, petitioner burned a cross in the yard of an AfricanAmerican family, and was charged with violating a local ordinance that
prohibited "plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, [or] object ...
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender . . . .,
In
striking down the statute, the Court held, "The First Amendment generally
prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed."' 18

172. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (holding that a
statutory prohibition on conduct is permissible under the First Amendment if, among other things, it "is
not being applied because of disagreement with the message presented"); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 375 (1968) (holding that conduct may not generally be regulated simply because it
"express[es] views" with which the government disagrees).
173. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
174. Id. at 415.
175. Id. at 412; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969) (holding that a person may
not be punished because he "failed to show the respect for our national symbol which may properly be
demanded of every citizen").
176. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
177. Id.at415.
178. Id. at416.
179. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting ST.PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
180. Id. at382 (internal citations omitted).
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Although the ordinance, as authoritatively construed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, prohibited only conduct amounting to "fighting words," 181 it
nonetheless targeted such conduct only when it expressed animus toward
certain groups. The Court noted that the ordinance applied only to displays that
"insult[ed], or provoke[d] violence 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion,
or gender."' 1 82 Consequently, "[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no
matter how vicious or severe, [we]re permissible unless they [we]re addressed
to one of the specified disfavored topics."' 83 This made the statute
unconstitutional, because "[t]he First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
'1 84
subjects."

The cases discussed throughout this Section dealt with expressive conduct.
As mentioned earlier, if the government seeks to prevent organ sales or
exchanges because they commodify or exhibit disrespect for the human body,
the government is treating those acts as expressive-that is, as conduct that
conveys a particular message. If the government cannot prohibit acts because
they express racial animus 185 or disrespect for the American flag, it surely
cannot prohibit acts to maintain the dignity of, or promote respect for, the
human body.
Finally, even if one believes that paired organ exchanges improperly
commodify the human body and that Congress may constitutionally prohibit
them, one must ask whether we should sacrifice the lives that a paired organ
exchange system could save in order to secure the largely symbolic benefit of
preventing some people from voluntarily commodifying their nonvital body
parts to help loved ones.
B. PreservingAltruism

Paired organ exchanges are vulnerable to another criticism-that organ
donation should be motivated by altruism and not by the desire to get
something in return. Many scholars claim that organ donation should stem from
a desire to help the community.' 86 It has been argued that "[A]ltruistic donation
181. Id. at 381.
182. Id. at 391.
183.

Id.

184. Id.
185. But see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (upholding sentencing
enhancement for "bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and
societal harm").
186. TRANSPLANTATION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 28 ("[Organ donation] promot[es]
a sense of community through acts of generosity... [and attaches] value [to] social practices that
enhance and strengthen altruism and our sense of community."); Ann McIntosh, Comment, Regulating
the 'Gift of Life' The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REv. 171, 178 (1990) ("The
donor's experience in enhancing or saving another's life brings the social community together.");
Murray, supra note 125, at 71 ("As individuals and as communities, we need the kinds of relationships
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has powerful psychological and social repercussions which are of value to
society and interpersonal relationships. Altruistic donation is seen as a free
expression of' 8 7 important human values as well as of communal
commitments."

One might claim that a donor in a paired organ exchange is motivated
primarily by the desire to help a loved one, and that such an act does not
demonstrate the selflessness and dedication to the public interest that an

unrestricted donation conveys.1 88 I find this objection unpersuasive on several
grounds.189 First, nearly all living organ donations are currently made to a
family member of the donor. A paired organ exchange system is no less
altruistic than the status quo; it is merely more effective in matching available
organs with compatible recipients. Second, I reject the premise that a donor in a
paired organ exchange is not acting altruistically. Donating an organ is an act of
generosity and love, whether the recipient is a family member, friend, or
stranger. Submitting to an invasive procedure to save the life of a loved one is a
selfless act of courage and compassion that should be encouraged and
facilitated. 190
VI. CONCLUSION
A paired organ exchange program would be the ideal supplement to the
U.S. organ procurement system. Paired organ exchanges promise to increase
the number of organs available for transplantation while avoiding the most

that gifts make possible ....[G]ifts of the body such as blood, tissues, and organs are an important and
powerful way in which we affirm our relationships with other members of our community.").
187. Cherry, supra note 51, at 6.
188. Put somewhat less charitably, "[o]nce the donor is getting something more than a warm glow
in return for consent to organ removal, the act is no longer properly called a donation at all, and so
consent for organ removal no longer expresses an altruistic concern for the beneficiaries of transplanted
organs." T. Tomlinson, Inducements for Donation: Benign Incentives or Risky Business?, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2204,2205 (1992).
189. Although this is not necessary to my argument, it is also worth reconsidering the centrality of
altruism to our organ procurement system. "[I]n our society, the basics of life-food, shelter, health
care-are already sold." Andrews, supra note 161, at 477. In organ transplantation, everyone receives
compensation-including surgeons, nurses, and hospitals-except for the donor. While "hospitals make
volumes of money from transplantation, physicians and associated health professionals advance careers
and incomes, drug companies profiteer, and the medical-industrial complex is enriched, the original
donor of tissues is expected to be altruistic." Dickens, supra note 161, at 905. Moreover, restricting
compensation for organ donation unfairly allows society as a whole to gain the ostensible benefits of
altruism, while the most serious burdens are placed on the shoulders of patients facing an organ
shortage. T.G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donation, 265 JAMA
1302, 1303 (1991) ("[O]ur unwavering belief that altruism must prevail dooms some of our own patients
who could be saved."). If altruism is truly a societal good, then it should be imposed in an area where
everyone incurs part of the cost of fostering it.
190. This is made even more apparent by the fact that some people will not help relatives in need.
See McFall. v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90 (C.P. 1978) ("Morally, this decision [to donate bone
marrow to a "close relative"] rests with defendant and, in the view of the court, the refusal of defendant
is morally indefensible. For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would
change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded.").
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serious moral quandaries associated with financial incentives. They offer
patients a ray of hope by allowing them to look not only to their own close
friends and families for compatible organs, but to the close friends and families
of the thousands of others patients on the transplant waiting list. Paired organ
exchanges bring strangers together to save lives; nothing can be more
compatible with the tenets underlying the American organ procurement system.

